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Abstract
For decades, the juvenile court has struggled to contain two contradictory, but
necessary theories of justice. This project employs an in-depth, single case study of an
urban juvenile court to demonstrate that contradictory juvenile justice models constrain
court actors, while also giving them discretion. Individuals within the juvenile system
hold ultimate responsibility for incorporating the rehabilitative juvenile model and the
traditional criminal model into their roles and practices. Court actors structure
interactions and goals based on attitudes regarding juvenile identity, self-identity, and
blame in order to reconcile institutional ambiguities and produce fair and just results.
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Chapter One:
Introduction
In the long life of a legal institution, the juvenile justice system is in the throes of
a tumultuous adolescence. Like the people it was designed to protect, the juvenile court is
fairly young. Pressured by demands of the past and pulled into the 21st century with new
ideas and concerns, the court struggles to find its place in the family of American
institutions. The juvenile court was born in Chicago, in 1899. By 2008, its purpose,
rationale, and practice have changed considerably. The court’s critics cite its lack of due
process, lack of oversight and appeals, and the failure of juvenile rehabilitation centers to
help children or to deter crime.1 Juvenile law scholar Barry Feld calls the modern
juvenile justice system, “an institution in search of a rationale.”2
Some elements of the juvenile court, however, remain constant. The juvenile
court has always existed to serve children. While this might seem obvious, this fact bears
repeating because due to its focus on children, the juvenile court constantly faces the
challenge of treating people who are neither full citizens nor non-citizens, who may be
regarded like adults, but are also fundamentally unlike adults. Juvenile are capable of
committing almost every crime for which adults have been incarcerated, yet young
people are not capable of understanding their crimes in the same way as an adult.3 Since
its creation, the juvenile court has claimed to protect and rehabilitate young people who
have strayed from the path of law-abiding behavior. On the other hand, society demands
justice for the victims of juvenile crime and requires protection from the most dangerous
1

Critics of the juvenile court include diverse scholars who emphasize due-process reform: e.g. Feld (2000),
Chen (2007), Messner (2006); de-criminalizing juvenile court: e.g. More and Wakeling (1997), Langley
(2005); the effectiveness of treatment: Caldwell et. all. (2006), Geary (2005); and the conflicting nature of
juvenile and defendant: McCulloch (2007), Rossiter (2006), Erlich (2003), Moore (2001), Beschle (1999).
2
Feld (2000). p. 774.
3
See e.g. Scott, Reppucci and Woolard (1995), Maroney (2006), Perrone et. all. (2004).
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young people. The juvenile court, thus, must punish crimes, but not create criminals. It
must protect both victims and perpetrators. It must force young people to comply with
laws over which they have no control and whose fundamental meaning is often
misunderstood.
The juvenile court’s creators designed an institution that treated children very
differently than adults were treated in the criminal courts. Progressive Era reformers
accepted the difficult task of creating an entirely new institution, with a philosophy that
had not been seen in Anglo-American jurisprudence.4 While this new institution called
itself a “court” and in some ways resembled other courts of its time, some of the
differences were so substantial that the early juvenile court could justifiably be termed a
social service agency as much as a legal institution. Over time, however, the court’s
original protective philosophy came under attack from many angles. Cumulatively, these
attacks have forced juvenile courts to adopt a model of justice that adopts important
elements of the criminal justice model, particularly those of procedural formality and
consequentialism.5 Both punitive and rehabilitative models of justice influence the
juvenile court’s rationale. The court treats young people as a distinct group with special
needs, but it also addresses issues like public safety and justice for victims of juvenile
crime.
I approach the paradox of the child and the criminal with the research question:
How can individuals within the court resolve institutional ambiguity for individual cases?
Clearly, juvenile cases do pass through the justice system; mechanisms within the court
for addressing the difficult questions of youth and law confront this challenge daily.

4
5

For early history on the juvenile court see e.g.: Getis (2000), Novkov (2000), Shaw (1930).
For juvenile court typology see e.g. Aday (1986).
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Children leave juvenile court and proceed to lead law-abiding lives, juvenile court is one
of the most widely copied American institutions around the world, and the system
“remains one of the most important social inventions of the modern period.”6 Somehow,
the juvenile court exists in a state of relative success and a state of conflict
simultaneously. Conflicts between different models of justice have failed to destroy this
evolving institution, but neither does the court seem to resolve the formal tension of its
mission. As a point of departure, this thesis assumes that the juvenile court confronts,
manages, or even reconciles institutional conflicts in its daily operations.
Contrary to the notion that juvenile courts maintain the traditional rationale of
protection and rehabilitation, some contemporary scholars view the juvenile court as
moving closer to the criminal model.7 Many scholars frame this as an either-or
proposition: either the court remains purely “juvenile” in the traditional sense or it has
changed to become a “criminal” model. According to these scholars, the two situations
cannot exist simultaneously. Some scholars reconcile this difficulty by arguing that the
system takes on different models of justice in different phases of the court.8 Instead, this
thesis begins its inquiry into court practices by contending that both juvenile and criminal
justice models must exist simultaneously within the juvenile court. Individual court actors
adapt their roles and behaviors within the inherent conflict between these two models.
Each court actor balances different modes of thought with each case in order to provide
justice to the juvenile and to the victim and also to provide what they believe will be the
most effective mechanism to return a delinquent to law-abiding behavior. Formal law,
with its reliance on strict divisions between concepts like child and adult, or guilty and
6

Coalition for Juvenile Justice. (1998) p. 10.
See e.g. Feld (2000).
8
See e.g. Kupchik (2006).
7
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not guilty, lacks the capacity to capture the nuance of the unique juvenile situation. Court
actors, therefore, work within the constraints of law to produce just results. They are, not
coincidentally, given a great deal of discretion since the formal structure in which they
function fails to adequately adapt to the needs of the juvenile and the community. Within
the paradox of juvenile justice comes its freedom to adapt.

The Research
This research was conducted in the delinquency court in the juvenile justice center
of Ingalls County, Minnesota. While many of the court actors that participated in my
research also work in child protection, family court, truancy, juvenile drug court, and
related areas, this study focuses solely on the question of juvenile delinquency, which
include all criminal offenses that have not been diverted to other agencies or courts. The
data come from observations of court proceedings, meetings between court actors and
interviews with members of the juvenile court community (judges, prosecutors, public
defenders, and mental health professionals). I collected observational data during
approximately six visits, a total of sixteen hours, to the court over the course of four
months, during which I observed competency hearings, initial calendars, petty calendars,
dispositions, informal conversations in judge’s chambers, plea agreements, and meetings
between court actors. During observation, I sat in the row of seats behind the opposing
parties’ tables or on the dais next to the law clerk. I was not able to record court
proceedings, nor obtain transcripts of the proceedings because, unlike adult cases, which
are a matter of public record, juvenile cases are sealed.

8

This study employs a sociolegal ethnographic technique employed by many in the
field of law and society who study how individuals influence legal processes.9 The single
case study provides an opportunity to obtain image of the people whose opinions,
attitudes, beliefs, ideologies, and actions impact young people most directly. Observation
and interview are crucial tools for understanding the power dynamics of a single juvenile
court and its actors, and for revealing the essential dilemma that faces the juvenile court
today. The question of how the court constructs responsibility in the absence of clear
institutional guidelines can only be truly understood at a local, personal level.
This thesis analyzes the court workgroup as an entity comprised of individual
experiences and attitudes, which is greater than each individual alone, rather than viewing
all juvenile actors as identical parts of a machine or the reverse, as autonomous and
unrestricted individuals. This study constructs a portrait of the range (if not the
frequency) of attitudes and reported behaviors in the juvenile court using the
organizational method and literature as a foundation.10 I, however, do not attempt to
provide a generalization about how juvenile court actors address issues of justice in all
courts across the country, rather I attempt to show how some court actors might confront
these questions. The name “Ingalls County” does not appear on any map of Minnesota
because it is a pseudonym for a real Minnesota county, whose identity is protected in
order to secure the confidentiality of the individuals who work within the juvenile court
and who provided the data used in this study.

9

See Chapter Two for discussion of the literature regarding sociolegal method.
Chapter Two provides a broader examination of this body of literature.
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In order to get a rich, deep picture of my single case study, I incorporate in-depth
interviews with on-site observation. During the interview portion of my research I
conducted twelve one-on-one interviews with three judges, four prosecutors, two mental
health workers, and three public defenders. These individuals ranged in age, experience,
gender, and race, in such a way that provided a diverse range of perspectives. Among the
court actors who agreed to give interviews, some had worked in the Ingalls County court
since the 1970s, while others had been there only a few years. There were an equal
number of male and female interview subjects and a variety of racial backgrounds
between the court actors. All subjects were professionals, with either law degrees or
medical degrees and every subject worked for the county or for the public defender’s
office.
The interviews were semi-structured, consisting of several foundational questions
and building upon the responses given by particular court actors. The interviews lasted
between 45 and 90 minutes and were recorded and transcribed for traditional qualitative
analysis. These interviews were private and confidential, however, many contacts came
from recommendations from other members of the court community, many of whom
were also subjects of my research. Due to the small size of the community, the close
proximity of court actor’s offices to each other, and the generally social nature of the
juvenile court community, my presence and work was discussed between many members
of the juvenile court community.
Ingalls County, an urban Minnesota jurisdiction, is home to a population
displaying diverse ethnicities and incomes. Juvenile courts vary from state to state and
county to county, so while it is impossible to prove that Ingalls County Juvenile Court
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represents the “normal” juvenile court, Ingalls County is not extreme or unique in any
particular way.11 Informal comparisons with other juvenile court settings, including a
neighboring county with a substantially different demographic profile, suggest no reason
to believe that Ingalls County strays too far from the typical processes of juvenile courts.
Based upon the most recent data available, Ingalls County Juvenile Justice Center
receives nearly 2,500 delinquency cases per year, a number that falls within the midrange of Minnesota counties, whose caseloads range from 751 to 4,436 cases per year. Of
the Ingalls County cases, just over a third (34.9%) were charged with felonies, another
13.7 % were gross misdemeanors, and nearly all of the remainder (51.5%) were petty
misdemeanors. Sliced another way, the frequency of each offense type echoes the state
level almost exactly. Demographically, the ages of Ingalls County juvenile defendants is
similar to the state average: 80.4% of Ingalls County juveniles are fourteen years old or
older, while none are younger than ten. Where Ingalls County differs notably from the
state average is in its racial diversity. Approximately 40% of juvenile court petitions
were filed for Black juveniles and 11% for Asian juveniles, compared to the statewide
rates of 18.2% and 3.5% respectively. While race may not be as prominent in other parts
of the state, Ingalls County made the racial component more accessible to study—as will
be explored in subsequent chapters—and thus enhances the overall desirability of this
county as a case study. Aside from racial diversity, however, little appears to distinguish
the juvenile court in Ingalls County from the institutions that operate across Minnesota.
The individuals working in Ingalls County address the same types of crimes, the same

11

Feeley (1979) provides the best articulation of the value of a single court study.
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level of severity, and the same age and gender breakdown as their colleagues across the
state.12

The Argument and Organization of Chapters
The strategies that court actors employ and the attitudes that they take toward
juvenile justice make up the content of this study. I examine how the court actor
constructs a the identity of a juvenile within the context of juvenile court and how the
court actor manipulates the juvenile court process with that construction of the juvenile in
mind. I argue that court actors make choices that promote rehabilitation, due process, or
punishment in different contexts with the court. The court actor chooses where to assign
blame, how to define his or her own role within the system, and how to justify the
process to the juvenile and to other members of the court community. Court actors use
certain language and make certain arguments that support a multi-faceted justice. While
different professional roles, such as prosecutor or public defender, influence the ways in
which an individual can respond to the challenges of juvenile justice, each individual,
regardless of role, incorporates some mechanism for reconciliation between punishment,
due process, and rehabilitation.
My analysis of juvenile court actors reveals a new dimension to juvenile justice. I
move beyond arguments about which model of justice dominates juvenile court
processes, and I describe a process that is richer than the legal framework in which it
resides. This study reveals the individual interactions that take place every day within the
court. These interactions are the crucial location for many of the decisions that are made

12

Research and Evaluation Court Services Committee (2005).
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about the court’s purpose and philosophy. While these decisions often have pragmatic
elements (such as the recognition that there are insufficient resources for every child to
get every service they could possibly require), they also have deeper implications for the
juvenile court.
When reconciling due process, punishment, and rehabilitation in juvenile justice,
court actors take two crucial steps. The first step is to identify that strange creature that is
the adolescent. Juvenile court actors need to know who they are bringing through the
legal system in order to create an approach that works for that creature. The juvenile, who
is neither completely responsible nor free and, in a sense, is not entirely a fully developed
person, provides a challenge for the court actor. Court actors’ assumptions about the
young person determine how they create a system that is effective and that justifies itself
to the population that it was designed to treat. There is not complete freedom in the
choices that court actors can make regarding juvenile justice. They function in the context
of a legal institution; they are not parents, social workers, teachers, or therapists and so
they are constrained by their reliance on the action-consequence model that court employ.
As such, while court actors blame many elements within and outside of the young
person’s control, they must structure their justification of the consequences around the
idea of personal responsibility.
In Chapter Two, I explore the historical trends that influenced the juvenile court’s
complex institutional development and set the scene for the individual case that I study. I
follow philosophic trends in the court, from the Progressive Era philosophy of
rehabilitation to the 1990s punishment philosophy, rather than following the juvenile
court’s history decade by decade. I also comment upon the particularities of Minnesota’s
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historical development. I then present the research that provides a foundation for this
study, both in its methodological contributions as well as in its substantive contributions
to the study of juvenile courts. Then, in Chapter Three, I situate my study within the legal
and institutional framework of the Minnesota juvenile court. I explain the legal
mechanisms that constrain court actors by providing parameters under which to dispense
justice. Chapter Four addresses the first critical question in this thesis: how do court
actors construct the juvenile? Chapter Five builds upon the court’s construction of the
juvenile, examining how court actors construct a process to fully include the juvenile in
the justice process. I conclude by showing how the ways in which court actors behave
within legal parameters suggests that the individual court actor holds much of the
responsibility for navigating a path to justice through the conflicting philosophies present
in the juvenile court.

14

Chapter Two:
Studying the Juvenile Court in Historical and Methodological
Perspectives
This chapter explores the history of the juvenile court as an institution and the
scholarship that informs our current understanding of the court. I begin by examining
juvenile justice in America by describing the fundamental philosophical, political, and
legal developments in the juvenile court over the last century. In the second section, the
Minnesota juvenile court’s historical development sets the foundation for a modern study
of juvenile courts in Minnesota. Finally, I examine research that employs different
frameworks, which I will use to better understand the juvenile court. This chapter situates
my method in academic and historical context to provide a greater appreciation for my
approach and conclusions. Additionally, this chapter provides a backdrop for the
challenges of juvenile justice faced daily by the subjects of this study.

The Juvenile Court’s History
On July 1, 1899, the first juvenile court opened its doors in Chicago, Illinois. By
the middle of the 20th century, every state in America provided a juvenile court based
upon the Chicago model. The ideal of the original juvenile court was that the child should
be treated as a subject of protection, rather than punishment. By the 21st century, the
American model of juvenile justice has spread across the world: “Of all the legal
institutions in Anglo-American history, the juvenile court has achieved the widest
acceptance among the diverse legal systems of the industrial democracies.”13 The
juvenile court is a relatively recent addition to the family of American legal institutions

13

Zimring (2000). p. 2479.
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and, unlike many other American institutions of government, it is not a legacy of
European law. The American juvenile court has evolved significantly, despite its relative
youth.
This chapter addresses three key ideas that provide the conflicting models of
justice in the contemporary juvenile court. The first philosophy is that of the Progressive
reformers who created a rehabilitative and protective juvenile court. The second
philosophy is that of due process. Advocates for due process argued that the juvenile
court, as a legal institution, should be held to the same legal and constitutional standard to
which criminal court would be held. Finally, this chapter demonstrates how the punitive,
public safety philosophy incorporated itself into the juvenile court’s rationale. This
chapter explores each philosophy through an historical lens, focusing on its significance
and purpose with regards to the juvenile court. Then, it examines the case of Minnesota
and shows the impact of national trends on this state, as well as how it differs from the
broader historical trajectory of juvenile justice in America.

Progressive Ideals
Precursors to modern juvenile courts began in the late 1800s in New York,
Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania. The Houses of Refuge, as these places were called,
were “more concerned with protecting young people than punishing them for their wrong
doings.”14 This theory incorporated new ideas about environment and free-will.
Reformers believed that poor living conditions in the immigrant slums of cities like
Boston and New York led children to commit crimes. Children needed state protection
from the lack of moral direction, education, and sanitation in these neighborhoods. These
14

Clarke (2005). p. 664.
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early reforms inspired later Progressive reformers to challenge the common law treatment
of children who committed crimes. At common law, criminal culpability began at age
seven. Thus, under this system, the court punished children and adults with equal
severity. The courts sentenced children to harsh punishments for their crimes, including
execution.15 Progressive activists first initiated a separate model of juvenile justice in
response to the deplorable treatment of child criminals under this 19th century common
law system.
The progressive conception of childhood as a separate and vulnerable
developmental stage was the driving force of the first separate juvenile courts. Children,
reformers argued, were not simply small adults, but should be a protected group with
special rights. According to the Progressives, the state had a special relationship to
children that did not exist between the state and free, rational adults.16 Progressives
thought that courts should not punish children but rather, should teach children how to be
productive and law-abiding citizens. Over fifty years later, Justice Fortas would describe
the founders of the juvenile justice movement as “Profoundly convinced that society’s
duty to the child could not be confined by the concept of justice alone. They believed that
society’s role was not to ascertain whether the child was ‘guilty’ or ‘innocent,’ but ‘what
is he, how has he become what he is, and what is to be done in his interest...”17 In a time
when children were merely small adults, the first American juvenile court challenged the
very nature of juvenile criminal responsibility.
The University of Chicago’s budding schools of sociology and psychology
provided many of the scholars who campaigned for the first juvenile court in Chicago.
15

Feld (2000). p. 3.
Ibid. p.2.
17
In re Gault. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
16
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These academics and activists set up homes in lower-class neighborhoods for middle
class volunteers to live alongside poorer immigrant families, believing that the city itself,
and specifically the environment surrounding the juvenile delinquent, was the source of
the child’s misbehavior. They studied the neighborhoods, their geography, demography,
and general atmosphere. Scholarly findings provided strong evidence in the campaign to
introduce a new court for troubled youth.18
Some scholars question the motives of the juvenile court’s founders, contending
that the new court was designed to indoctrinate immigrant children with the ideals of the
American middle class, such as the Protestant work-ethic, temperance, obedience, and
social conformity. In this view, the juvenile court, in essence, served to replace the
child’s parents with a more “American” institution. This contention is not entirely
antithetical to the rosier picture of Progressive reformers as the child’s only defense
against brutal criminal punishments. The juvenile court served both protective and
educational purposes, both of which defended children by teaching them middle-class
morality. Indeed, many court actors of the early period appear to have been deeply
concerned with the way that poor, immigrant families raised their children. Many
reformers considered poor parenting the primary indicator of juvenile delinquency. This
concern was also a motivating factor in early 20th century child labor laws.19 Progressives
seized upon protective child policies, in labor and criminal law, as a tool to replace
family education with state education, which was more in line with Progressive values.
This was necessary, reformers argued, because, “not all parents were sufficiently

18
19

See e.g. Getis (2000).
See e.g. Novkov (2000).
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inculcated with … ‘American’ values.20” The juvenile court thus served an educational
function, which complemented the new, compulsory public education. Typical
Progressives believed that “Children, particularly the offspring of immigrants,
desperately needed education in order to prepare themselves for citizenship…public
education was… seen as a means of translating American values and beliefs to
children.”21
At the turn of the 19th century, many Americans began to reconsider the meaning
of childhood. The change in norms about childhood paralleled changes in the family,
education, employment, and the role of the state; all of which to varying degrees, related
to the early juvenile court. At the broadest level, the Progressive Era started the federal
and state governments on the road to protective policies and away from the laissez-faire
policies that dominated post-Civil War policy. Supporters of parens patriae argued that
the state had an active duty to the child to protect and defend him from corruption, abuse,
and neglect. The state was required to assume a parental role in the absence of competent
biological parents. This attitude had a distinctly moralistic purpose; many Progressives
saw the court as an opportunity to protect poor children from the temptations of sinful
life.22
The juvenile court model reflected these Progressive values. The court was not
constrained by sentencing guidelines, procedural formality, or even constitutional due
process protections. The court was non-adversarial in the sense that there was no defense
attorney to argue the merits of guilt or innocence, but rather a judge who determined
outcomes based on his perception of the child’s best interest. Early juvenile courts were
20

Ibid. p. 379.
Ibid. p. 381.
22
See e.g. Getis (2000).
21
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characterized by informal, personal interactions between judge and child wherein the
judge would question the child to get an understanding of his disposition and history
before deciding what reform was needed.

Due Process Reform
The juvenile court maintained its identity as an essentially protective institution
even after the Progressive Era ended. While new youthful defendants passed through the
system, the model of personalized justice did not change. Personalized justice, however,
had serious negative implications. In some cases, the juvenile court became a seat of local
despotism. This change came gradually because without oversight or due process
restrictions to limit juvenile court judges, there was no recourse to question the judge’s
decisions. Over time, some judges, with unlimited control over their defendants, began to
abuse that power in the name of child protection. The juvenile court judge could, and did,
use his discretionary powers to incarcerate young delinquents for long stretches without
allowing the child to access an attorney, be heard by a jury, or even face his accuser.
Reform schools, especially during times of economic hardship, were little better than
prisons. The exercise of unrestrained power within the juvenile court went largely
uncontested while the nation’s focus was elsewhere.23
A young man named Gerald Gault ultimately pulled the juvenile court out of
stagnation. The State of Arizona held Gerald Gault, a boy of fifteen, in a reform school
until his majority for making prank telephone calls. Gault was not allowed to speak with
an attorney about his rights during his arrest or court appearances. He did not have the
legal right to confront or call witnesses, gave a questionable confession, and the police
23

Some of the best early analysis of this critical case comes from Lefstein et. all (1969).
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did not give his parents any warning of his arrest.24 These protections, the state argued,
were not necessary because the reform school did not constitute punishment, but rather
the rehabilitation that the boy required. Gault’s experience was typical of the early 20th
century juvenile court. The judge in his case did not provide the basic constitutional
rights that would have been afforded an adult in Gerald’s place. The major difference
with Gault was that he profited from an era of criminal rights reform on the national stage
by bringing his case to the U.S. Supreme Court. In doing so, Gault catapulted the juvenile
court into a new era.
The most effective attack against the traditional model of juvenile court started in
the 1960s and 1970s in conjunction with other cases that gave children more
constitutional rights, such as Tinker v. Des Moines.25 In addition to writing the majority
opinion in Tinker, Justice Fortas also wrote an opinion that had the potential to
dramatically change the juvenile court. The Supreme Court’s 1967 decision In re Gault
extended to juvenile offenders the constitutional rights to counsel, against selfincrimination, and the right to call and cross-examine witnesses. In his opinion, Justice
Fortas wrote, “Juvenile Court has demonstrated… that unbridled discretion, however
benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principles and procedure.”26
In re Gault exposed serious flaws in the execution of justice in the juvenile court
model. A child could be sentenced to years of confinement in supposedly “rehabilitative”
facilities for relatively minor crimes without any constitutional protections. These
problems led the Supreme Court to apply certain constitutional protections to minors,

24

In re Gault. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
26
In re Gault. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
25
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including the right to a public defender. One major difference, which remained, was that
minors were not granted the right to a jury trial.
Gault ameliorated some of the injustices of the juvenile system, but it did so by
moving juvenile court procedure and standards of evidence closer to the adult model,
which revealed serious new consequences. In a fundamental change for an institution
created to treat each child differently, these practices limited the personal attention and
flexibility of juvenile court judges in each case. Further, by incorporating attorneys into
the process, it made the juvenile court more adversarial, increasing the likelihood that the
crux of the case was proving the child’s guilt, rather than exploring the external factors
that led to the crime. The move toward standardization included, in some states,
mandatory jurisdictional transfer to adult court and other measures that serve to treat
older, more violent juvenile offenders like adults. These statutory changes were
frequently unrelated to the child’s interests, but rather are justified by concerns about
public safety.

Punishment and Public Safety Fears
Today, many states have modified their juvenile system to include blended
sentencing models where minors who begin in juvenile court can move to adult court for
trial or sentencing based on age, seriousness of the crime, violence, and repeat offenses.
Blended sentencing is designed “To balance the rehabilitative goals of the juvenile
system with the increased demand for public protection and youth accountability.”27 The
mixed adult and juvenile system is only possible because the juvenile court has modified
its progressive values to meet contemporary demands. The law subjects minors to
27

Clarke (2005). p. 682.
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punitive consequences such as incarceration, which run counter to the initial philosophy
of the juvenile court, because the court includes public safety concerns in juvenile cases.
As early as the 1970s, some states started instituting mandatory jurisdictional transfer
laws. Since then, the majority of states have adopted some form of jurisdictional transfer
policy.28
The juvenile court did not follow a straight path from protection to retribution, but
until the late 1990s, the country as a whole moved in the punishment direction. Increase
in juvenile crime rates that began in the 1980s and leapt to public attention with the highprofile school shooting cases of the 1990s sparked public demand for punitive reforms.29
The change in institutional purpose is best exemplified by changing legislative intent
laws, which explicitly state that the juvenile court also has a responsibility, balancing its
original social work mission, to protect the general public from violent and dangerous
juvenile offenders.
Policy-makers and the general public dramatically shifted their views regarding
juvenile offenders during the 1960s and increasing in intensity since the 1980s. Public
opinion demands stricter standardization within the court and more punitive
consequences for juvenile crime.30 At the same time, recent research in child psychology
has shown that adolescents are not cognitively prepared to assume the same responsibility
for criminal action as are adults.31 Policy-makers and child psychologists do not always
construct the same understanding of juvenile responsibility because of their different
goals and standards of evidence. As a result, the community of policy-makers and the
28
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community of child psychologists face extreme disagreement about some legal questions
in the juvenile court, such as the role of incarceration.32
Individual discretion within juvenile court led to more variation among the state’s
juvenile courts than exist between their criminal courts. National historical trends only
show part of the picture because this study concerns specifically the Minnesota juvenile
court. Unique qualities of Minnesota play an equal, if not more important role, in the
character of the current juvenile court than does the national narrative. I compare the
national and statewide juvenile court history to understand the broad and local influences
on the court today.

Minnesota’s Juvenile Court
Minnesota adopted the juvenile court as a statewide institution soon after Illinois
created the first juvenile court in 1899. Like many states during the Progressive Era, the
Minnesota juvenile court of 1905 espoused protective, reform ideals.33 The purpose and
procedural flexibility of the early Minnesota juvenile court also mimicked the Chicago
court. Unlike some juvenile courts of the era, the Minnesota juvenile court dealt with
juvenile victims of neglect, as well as delinquent offenders, demonstrating its highly
protective nature. Thus, the juvenile court took on both the role of teaching wayward
children right from wrong and of protecting neglected children from further abuse.
Before Gault, Minnesota courts determined that mandatory reform school for juvenile
delinquents did not constitute imprisonment. Reform school was a tool through which the
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state assumed the role of parent.34 According to one scholar, “Minnesota was clearly one
of the most progressive states, certainly on the vanguard of the reform trends of the early
1900s.35” In contrast to its progressive reform ethic, Minnesota juvenile courts were also
capable of fostering troubling abuses of power. Therefore, “Despite these high ideals and
lofty goals, the questions of due process and the right of the State and the courts to
intervene in the lives of children and families continued to be raised in the court
system.”36
The Minnesota higher court examined the juvenile court system with particular
care during the 1960s. The Supreme Court in Minnesota responded to national and local
pressure to provide standards for juvenile court by creating a set of non-binding
guidelines for the state. Several rural Minnesota counties chose to adopt the Rules for
Procedure for Juvenile Court Proceedings in Minnesota Probate-Juvenile Courts, while
the two most populous counties, Hennepin and Ramsey, chose not to adopt the standards.
For nearly twenty years, the result of reform in Minnesota was greater procedural
disparities among counties. Since then, the juvenile court has increased in formality. In
1983, the Minnesota Supreme Court set forth uniform rules of procedure for the entire
state. Courts across the state were required to comply with issues of time, punishment,
guaranteed rights, and record keeping. The state responded to gang violence and
heightened violent juvenile crime in the mid 1990’s by changing its laws regarding
transfer to adult court, stressing the importance of public safety. The juvenile court,
which is divided by the same districts as criminal court, remains a multi-purpose
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institution.
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The following chapter explores 21st century Minnesota juvenile court

procedures and actors in greater depth.
The succeeding section positions this thesis' research, conducted in a single
Minnesota juvenile court, in a greater field of scholarship. This review of scholarship
draws from a range of social science disciplines and methodological approaches. Its goal
is to frame the essential philosophies about the purpose of juvenile justice and then
examine the methods for studying the court, which provide inspiration for this study of a
Minnesota juvenile court.

Frameworks for Studying the Juvenile Court
An exercise in social engineering since its creation, the juvenile court and the
young people who pass through its doors provide rich sources of data for scholars from a
wide variety of disciplines. Psychologists, sociologists, legal scholars and political
scientists have engaged in rich debate and produced a deep literature at many levels
including organizational and individual behavior and policy design.38 This thesis draws
on two veins of research in order to understand juvenile court organization and court
actors’ interactions in general. Substantively, this review of scholarship explores lessons
to be taken from literature concerning the juvenile court, which employs widely differing
methods and approaches. Particular emphasis is places upon literature, which uses a
qualitative sociolegal method. Exploring this literature demonstrates how the goals of this
thesis complement existing research and provide new insights into the treatment of
juveniles in the legal system.
37

Ibid., p. 900.
For child psychology research see e.g. Dictaldo and Everett (2008), Caldwell et. all. (2006), Young et.
all. (2006), Geary (2005), Perrone et. all. (2004).

38

26

Despite the wealth of discussion given to juvenile courts, what remains is the
study of juvenile court actors as a workgroup that creates a juvenile-specific approach to
justice within the constraints of the juvenile justice system. Those who study court actors’
actions after the child has been transferred to adult court, and those who study how
policy-makers ought to structure the court, do not address how court actors might be
orchestrating such changes before any commands from higher courts or from policymakers even reach the individual child. Additionally, these scholars fail to recognize the
unique power that court actors wield in light of the complex model of justice in which
they practice law.
Straddling the distinction between the substance and method of prior research,
two approaches to the study of juvenile courts, grounded in the dominant ambitions of
their respective disciplines, have come to control the field. The first method, employed
primarily by legal scholars, focuses on the court as an institution, its procedures,
limitations, organization, outcomes, and goals. The second method, employed by
sociologists and organizational political scientists, uses qualitative analysis to explain the
relationships between people within the system and how their beliefs and actions serve to
shape the institution. These differences in method reflect the identities and purposes of
the researchers. Legal scholars writing for law reviews most frequently use the first
method, which gives priority to the institution, its capacity and outcomes.39 Proscriptive
questions of juvenile court purpose and direction drive these studies. Sociologists and
other social scientists are primarily motivated to explain how individuals in the court
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community shape its procedures and meaning. They use an interview and observationbased qualitative method to explore construction of meaning and the exchange of
power.40

Legal Scholars, Law Reviews and the Legal Institution
Legal scholars of the juvenile court tend to argue for institutional change
abhorring the inconsistent hybrid that exists today. These scholars frame the issues of
debate around a series of dichotomies: rehabilitation or punishment, offender or offensebased justice, child or adult?41 Legal scholars focus their normative debate on whether the
court ought to move toward a more offender-based model (like the traditional juvenile
court) or a more offense-based model (like the current adult criminal court). The
offender-based model reflects the idea that children ought to be treated with particular
attention to their unique cognitive development. The offense-based model, on the other
hand, entails punishment based entirely on the severity of the crime and may better fit
recent trends in punitive and adversarial justice suggested by some policy-makers.
To be sure, juvenile crime is not the same as it was one hundred years ago in
Chicago, nor have juvenile courts remained static institutions. The legal debate regarding
the direction of the juvenile court as an institution, however, misses the crucial location
where conflict between different models occurs. Rather than arguing that the juvenile
court ought to move toward a more criminal model or that it ought to return to its roots as
a protective institution, legal scholarship would be broadened by the idea that both
models have their place in juvenile justice. Instead of debating the institutional
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philosophy, legal scholars need to begin examining how individuals within the court
balance models of justice.
In the polarized debate that has emerged, one group of legal scholars argue that
the essence of juvenile court is harmful to children, taking the argument for a single
criminal court from the due process ideals of Justice Fortas. One of the foremost legal
scholars in juvenile justice – and one of the most controversial – Barry Feld’s vocal
critique of the traditional juvenile justice model attacks both its implementation and its
conceptual base. Why do juveniles require substantially different courts, procedures, and
personnel than do adults? Feld concludes that the Progressive reformers misunderstood
the purpose of legal institutions: “The original juvenile court was conceived of as a social
service agency in a judicial setting, a fusion of social welfare and social control. But
providing for child welfare is ultimately a societal responsibility rather than a judicial
one.”42 What does this suggestion mean for juvenile justice? Feld argues for the
elimination of juvenile court because the lack of due process and clearly legal rationale
makes judicial discretion too broad. Thus, the court fails to provide the child with the
necessary due process protections to safeguard against tyrannical decisions on the part of
the judge. Following Feld, some scholars contend that the critical difference between a
juvenile and an adult offender takes place during the sentencing phase of court
proceedings and that so long as the judge is able to punish children and adults
differently,43 then the same tenets of due process and criminal law ought to be followed
in all cases.
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Many scholars disagree.44 Rather than moving closer to an adult model, some
critics maintain that the proper response is to make the juvenile court into an even more
distinct institution with stronger distinctions between child and adolescent offenders. It
does not require legal expertise to see that a ten-year-old and a sixteen-year-old have
different understandings of right and wrong, are at different stages in their emotional and
cognitive development, and might not be responsible in the same way for their actions.
Many voices in the legal community advocate multi-court systems; while their
conceptions of juvenile court vary, the basic premise is the same: that all minors do not
have the same needs and levels of understating and responsibility. These scholars argue
that the dramatic differences in cognitive and emotional ability among minors necessitate
a broader spectrum of responses than one court can provide.
Two important distinctions animate the differences of opinion between the two
camps of scholars. The first concept regards the essential role of the court. One approach
frames the court as an assignor of blame and guilt; the other casts the juvenile court as the
protector of children in need. The other important distinction lies in the emphasis that is
placed upon the child’s agency and level of culpability. This scholarship defines the basic
parameters of the debate regarding juvenile court philosophies, but misses the reality that
these models are both necessary in juvenile court. They provide insight into the debate
over institutional purpose and rationale, but this is however, only the first step in the
process of discovering how relationships within the court influence its norms and
procedures.
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Court Organization and Legal Roles
The juvenile court is a rich place to enquire about people and their interactions
because the high level of discretion and lack of oversight allow uniqueness that would be
impossible in more formal courts. For this reason, the scholarship examining court actors,
which sets forth the fundamental purpose of qualitative methodology in sociolegal
research, is an ideal foundation for studying the juvenile court. Scholars who use this
method in political science and sociology do so in order to reveal substantively different
information about the legal system than do historical, comparative, or quantitative legal
scholars. Political Scientists broke significant ground in the 1970s and 1980s by adapting
organizational models and organizational sociology toward the study of court systems.
While these studies are still read and taught today, their theories have not been applied
within juvenile courts. The juvenile court setting is fundamentally different than other
court scenarios. Additionally, social science tools for understanding how court actors
affect "justice" have advanced. This study, therefore, fills a significant gap in our
understanding of courts in America: the juvenile justice system as constructed through
the micro-level dynamics of its workgroup participants.
The sociolegal method deepens the understanding of relationships between
individuals and demonstrates how these individuals impact court processes. As one
scholar notes, an important aim of sociolegal research is to understand, “…the exercise of
power and construction of meaning in … [legal] interaction.”45 Social scientists
commonly begin this type of research by disaggregating the court as an organization to
find systems of actors. In organizational research, each actor within the court plays an
integral role in creating the court’s identity in terms of power relations, procedures, and
45
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language. Thus, the court provides more than merely a physical location for the
implementation of decisions made by autonomous actors (such as judges). Instead, the
courthouses group activity, where “Most persons…perform specialized functions, and
their activity fits into a broader pattern and is constrained by it.”46 This research also
interprets meaning with the court. Scholars who study court actors in an interpretive light
examine the “generation and reproducing of structures of meaning”47 rather than how a
certain decision causes a certain outcome. Meaning reflects how people justify or explain
their choices and behavior. This method frames court actors as producers of meaning,
who do not simply apply strict legal principles, but who also infuse their own beliefs,
values and experiences into the legal process.
Organizational and interpretive legal scholarship shows a picture of court
decision-making that is quite different from the traditional understanding. Individuals
with unique roles and perspectives create a communal understanding of the law and of
the role of law. Individuals with unique roles and perspectives create a communal
understanding of the law and of the role of law. Rather than the clash of conflicting rules,
different people with varying levels of power and with divergent understandings of the
law struggle for dominance. The subject of research differentiates an organizational study
of the juvenile court and a legal study of the court as an institution; exemplified by
scholars like Feld. One enquires about people, while the other examines rules and
processes.
The constant presence in this method is the level of observation and in-depth
interviewing, which scholars require. These scholars examine areas of personal choice,
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power, language, and relationships rather than asking questions of size or frequency. This
thesis adopts the same thorough interview technique to compile data for this study. The
following literature models interview and observation techniques, which provided
guidance and inspiration for this thesis.
Formative scholars of the 1970s believed that understanding the court as a set of
rules failed to explain “…decisions… made as a consequence of an uncharted, complex,
and interdependent set of relationships.”48 Malcolm Feeley became one of the foremost
scholars in court organizational literature, demonstrating the key areas of sociolegal
inquiry, which include location, actors, procedures, interactions, and outcomes. Also
responding to the confusion regarding court relationships, Felony Justice represents
another formative text in the sociolegal field. Its authors, James Eisenstein and Herbert
Jacob, argue that “What judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, and others do depends
heavily on how they interact with each other. None works alone. Rather they are
interconnected through an intricate system of countervailing powers.49” These scholars
demonstrated the importance of the personal and interactive nature of the court using an
organizational model. This method encompasses the court as a whole, showing how
different individuals can persuade, compromise, and influence decisions beyond those
over which they have strict statutory control.
Eisenstein and Jacob provide the term courtroom workgroup to define the scope
of individuals within the court organization. They limit participants of the organization to
those actors who have a role in a specific courtroom. This model may work for larger
courts and for adult criminal court; however, in juvenile court the workgroup can be
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considerably more complex. In the juvenile court many professionals, from psychologists
to probation officers, participate in the interpretation of a child’s case, but do not always
appear in the courtroom. Scholars of juvenile court better understand the nature of
juvenile court interactions with a more inclusive view of the members of a court
organization.
Many researchers have followed Feeley’s approach to examine different court
scenarios since the 1970s. A notable recent case focuses on the creation of drug courts in
California. Burns and Peyrot show how “…judges and defendants interact to construct
the defendant…”50 using court observation and individual interviews. They argue that
this method of research takes into account “…the organizationally and institutionally
specific competencies and features that comprise the dynamics under investigation.”51
This study provides a model of judge and defendant interaction where, like in the juvenile
court, the goals are not merely punitive and the judge has considerable discretion in
deciding the path of the individual defendant.
Social scientists also use interpretive legal scholarship, which focuses on how
meaning is constructed in the law and how meaning is negotiated based upon the power
within the legal organization, to understand court dynamics. Interpretive scholars contrast
their research with scholarship that treats law and lawyers as tools to achieve goals that
are outside of the law. In other words, “Law is understood entirely in terms of the
material results that it produces, or in terms of the distributional consequences of
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legality.52” Instead, interpretive legal scholarship seeks to understand the social effect of
the legal structure itself.
Scholars have not yet fully examined the complex relationship between court
actors and children despite the method for understanding the court as an organization on a
broad level. Scholars do not fully understand how these relationships translate into
decisions regarding the responsibility (and culpability) of juveniles. In the strongest
recent research, Aaron Kupchik began to remedy this apparent lack of information
regarding the juvenile system by studying juveniles in adult court. Kupchik uses
qualitative and quantitative comparative methodologies, unlike some of the earlier, purely
qualitative scholars. Kupchik argues that judges use a traditional construction of
childhood in the punishment phase of criminal court. In other words, even in adult court,
the court actors treat a minor as a child when dealing with sentencing, but not during the
trial and other court proceedings focused on finding the facts of the case. Kupchik,
however, uses a comparative methodology, studying the treatment of juveniles in juvenile
court versus adult court and to show this contrast, his model relies more heavily on
statistical and quantitative data. This shows the frequency of various outcomes for
juveniles in the adult system, but provides less information about the way that court
actors besides the judge influence these outcomes.53 Significantly, Kupchik’s study was
based upon juvenile cases after the juvenile had been transferred to adult criminal court
by external mandate. He is concerned with juveniles that have already been placed in
adult criminal court due to externally imposed constraints (i.e. statutory thresholds of
jurisdictional transfer). This thesis employs a similar qualitative methodology and body
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of literature, but is concerned more with how court actors negotiate the path of a juvenile
case within the juvenile court due to their understanding of childhood.
This thesis provides a unique perspective on broad legal questions through the
words of local court actors. Legal professionals can explain the philosophy and
organization of the juvenile court in a way that is impossible at the higher court level
because they are deeply involved with the juvenile court process. This thesis seeks to
demonstrate how court actors interpret the direction of the court by asking about
interactions between legal professionals and juveniles. The individual interactions
between judge, attorney, and child affect the court proceedings that follow.
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Chapter Three:
Paths through the Minnesota Juvenile Court
In light of the scholarship on courts in general, examined in the last chapter, I now
turn to the process and law in Minnesota, which provides the framework in which Ingalls
County operates. This chapter follows the procedure and court actors unique to
Minnesota juvenile courts. Understanding the path that a juvenile takes through the court
system provides vital insight into the original data examined in the following chapters.
Unique procedural guidelines provide opportunities for court actors to make choices
involving the juvenile. It is primarily these choices which drive the study of juvenile
court actors.
Like children’s “choose your own adventure” stories, the path through the
juvenile court has many beginnings, decision-points, and endings. Each decision made by
the child or by a court actor leads the case in a different direction. Case outcomes rely on
a variety of factors and branch out like roots moving deeper into the system. Children in
the court system encounter judges, probation officers, prosecutors, defense attorneys,
psychologists, and the myriad support staff who move cases through courtroom,
detention center, and through probation for years after the offense was committed.
Prosecutors make difficult choices every day about whether to keep juvenile offenders in
juvenile court, certify them to adult court, or balance the two with extended jurisdiction
juvenile. Most juveniles called to the delinquency courtrooms of the juvenile justice
center only come once, plead to a petty offense and return to their lives. Other young
people come to know the court system better than most adults ever do.
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The child makes some of the choices that affect the path taken though the court,
while other choices reside in the discretion of professionals. Due partly to the
individualized nature of juvenile court, there are more options for the trajectory of a
juvenile case than for an adult committing the same offense. The discretionary nature of
the court, however, is not always evident since many cases follow routine paths through
the court. The difference, however, exists in the court’s ability to impose consequences
not determined by sentencing guidelines (as they are in adult court) and in the many
possibilities for parties to resolve the case in ways the reflect the juvenile’s specific
needs. The purpose of this chapter is to explore the many possible alternatives for a
young person in a Minnesota juvenile court. The chapter relies on observation supported
by Minnesota statute and the Minnesota Supreme Court’s rules of procedure to construct
an image of the juvenile court and the people who work within it.

Juvenile Court Statute and Procedure
There are many branches of juvenile court: drug court, truancy, runaway, child
protection, custody, adoption, and child support, which are not included in this chapter.
This study examines the unique delinquency component of juvenile court, which reveals
the contradictory modes of justice present in juvenile court. Juvenile delinquency court is
guided by rules and statute, like any other court, but the individuality and judicial
discretion are revealed in the variety of choices available at each step in the process.
These choices produce outcomes that are, at least ideally, designed to restore the juvenile
to law-abiding behavior. Minnesota delinquency statute emphasizes the unique purpose
of juvenile justice. Minnesota lawmakers claimed that their intent with the act setting
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forth the rules of juvenile court, “Is to promote the public safety and reduce juvenile
delinquency by…prohibiting certain behavior and by developing individual responsibility
for lawful behavior.” 54 Consequences are designed to limit the burden upon the child,
including that fines “shall not impose an undue financial hardship on the child.”55 The
juvenile statue also allows for child development in ways that adult criminal law does not
address, such as the right of the court to expunge juvenile records at any time.56

Paths through the Court
Arriving on the delinquency floor of the juvenile law center a young person first
encounters the sheriff’s deputy guarding the door to chambers. The youth turns a corner
and sees a large waiting area, its broad windows looking out over the city. At the end of
the hall are offices, where people in suits rush in and out. It is a bright, open space, but
the inner offices hide the heart of the court from young eyes. The juvenile sits down in
the lobby and waits his turn in front of the judge. The first step in the juvenile justice
process is the same for all young offenders. The police give him a petition naming his
offenses, which is the juvenile equivalent of a charge. At this point, the officer decides if
the juvenile should be released to his parents or detained in the juvenile detention center
pending trial. The timeline for in custody cases is much stricter than for out of custody
cases, where the juvenile might be called to appear weeks later.
If a juvenile is detained, the public defender introduces herself to her new client in
the detention center the morning after the arrest. The public defender carries the petition
and sometimes a partial history of the juvenile’s prior record with her into the detention
54
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center. The style of discussion varies between attorneys, but the purpose is uniform.
Universal issues include: Does the child want to plead guilty or go to trial? Is he
competent to stand trial? Is his story glaringly different from the police report? That
morning at the hearing for juveniles who have been detained, the juvenile either pleads
the case or the attorney will call for a Rule 20, which examines the child’s competence to
stand trial. An out of custody juvenile will go through a similar process, but will be called
to court by a notice to appear and will meet the defense attorney in the waiting room at
the courthouse on the day of the initial appearance. This means a longer timeline between
the offense and the initial appearance. If a juvenile pleads not guilty at the initial
appearance, then the case will be set on the calendar for trial. A guilty plea requires more
examination. The judge must determine that the child is pleading with full knowledge of
his rights and without coercion. Then, the public defender questions the child in order to
provide a record of the events to which the child is pleading guilty.57 After all parties are
satisfied that there has been a sufficient record of events, the judge either determines the
disposition or sets the case on for disposition at a later date. Disposition is the juvenile
equivalent of a sentence. The disposition, however, is not restricted by the sentencing
guidelines of criminal court and many elements of disposition are services provided to
the juvenile delinquent, rather than punishment like incarceration.
Behind the closed office doors at the end of hall, attorneys have been preparing
busily for the morning’s cases for several hours before the morning calendar begins. The
charging attorney reviews all petitions written by the police and determines with which
offense each juvenile will be charged. The attorney reviews the case for legal sufficiency;
the quality and constitutionality of the evidence determine the range of options open to a
57
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prosecutor at this stage. Beyond deciding if a confession was constitutional or a search
was done with probable cause, the attorney will also review the child’s record. Some
first-time low-level cases are selected for diversion from the courts to send to a
community-based agency for resolution, such counseling or anger management classes. A
diverted case never gets filed in the court.58 Often, defense attorneys, county attorneys
and probation officers will meet in the morning to discuss options for various juvenile
offenders. If her client has chosen to plead guilty, the defense attorney may meet with the
charging attorney before the initial appearance to negotiate a deal for her client. Each part
of the court has its own branch office in the juvenile center in close proximity to each
other and to the courtrooms. Throughout the day, there is constant interaction and
discussion between members of the different offices. It is a small community where
personal interaction plays a strong role in the everyday working of the court.
While much of the court’s work goes on in the back offices, the child’s
experience is often limited to that which takes place inside the courtroom. There are two
courtrooms, which follow the same general layout as many criminal courtrooms, with
opposing council tables facing an elevated bench where the judge, clerk, and court
reporter sit. The largest different between the juvenile courtroom and the basic design of
a criminal courtroom is that there is no jury box and no gallery. Once the juvenile enters
the court one of several things can happen. First, the judge will ask for appearances, to
which each person sitting at counsel table states his or her name and job title. Sitting at
the prosecutor’s table is most likely a county attorney and a probation officer. At the
defense table is the defense attorney, who is most likely a public defender since all
juveniles have the right to a public defender regardless of their parents’ income, the
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juvenile and commonly a parent. Juveniles have a legal right to have a parent or guardian
present at counsel table during any proceeding in the court. Members of the public are
barred from juvenile cases, but the court may allow people with direct interest in the case,
court workers, and the victim to be present at any hearings.59
Next, the judge determines whether the juvenile has a sufficient understanding of
his rights to proceed, in part by asking if the juvenile has read, understood and signed his
statement of rights. The statement of rights essentially outlines constitutional rights of the
accused. In a petty case, the judge will speak directly to the juvenile, while in a
misdemeanor or felony case she will talk to the defense attorney. After the statement of
rights is read and signed, the juvenile must enter a plea. One Ingalls County judge says to
each juvenile, “You have a choice to make at this point, you can either deny the charges
and then the state would have to prove that you did it beyond a reasonable doubt or you
can plead guilty. I’m not going to force you one way or another, but you have to make a
choice.”
A “not guilty” plea sets the matter on for trial. A “guilty” plea begins another
round of questioning to ensure that the child has not been coerced and that he understands
that he is waving his right to a trial and his right against self-incrimination. Either the
judge or the defense attorney asks the juvenile a series of questions to prove that the child
is pleading to events that actually took place. Disposition occurs once the judge and
prosecutor are satisfied that the offense has been adequately described for the record.
Disposition, or sentencing as it is called in criminal court, determines what the juvenile
will do once guilt is established. Probation provides a report, either oral or written,
outlining what they think the disposition should include. To encourage fairness and
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relative uniformity among dispositions, probation makes recommendations in committee.
These committees try to treat similar juveniles in similar manners, arguing that a single
probation officer is more likely to deviate from dispositional norms. In more serious
cases, disposition is scheduled for a later date so that probation and the victim advocate
can examine the damages of the case, the child’s family history, and any medical and
mental health issues that might impact the disposition.60 The judge determines disposition
in less serious cases on the day of the initial hearing, provided that the young person
pleads guilty. The probation officer gives recommendations and the defense attorney and
county attorney argue the merits of these recommendations. Defense attorneys attempt to
mitigate probation’s recommendation and lessen the burden on their clients, while the
county attorney has already met with probation and agreed to their terms.
Disposition for minor offenses often involves community service and restitution.
The court has discretion in this area, but the statutory guidelines for disposition include:
supervision by probation, out-of-home placement, payment of fines up to $1,000, mental
and physical health care, and mandatory school enrollment.61 Victim crimes can include a
no-contact order, which is uniquely complicated for juveniles since many offenders and
victims go to the same school, ride the bus together, or are in the same after school
program. Repeat offenders, however, rarely get simple community service. Out-of-home
placements range from group homes to long-term out-of-state facilities. The Ingalls
County juvenile center has a short-stay detention center, where juvenile delinquents can
take classes taught by teachers in the local school district and do work service for up to
one month.
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Treatment and rehabilitation remain essential elements of the juvenile court’s
tools to combat delinquency. Due process attacks on the court, however, have limited the
scope of the what the court can do in the name of rehabilitation. Chemical dependency
and mental health issues plague juvenile offenders. The court offers services like drug
rehabilitation, anger management, family and personal counseling, and referrals to more
intensive programs for cases of extreme mental illness. For first-time petty offenders,
these services are frequently offered, but not required. Seriously troubled children are
often required to take advantage of the programming provided by the court.62 The court
has a mandated “least restrictive” policy, meaning that the disposition will include the
program that invades the least onto the home and personal life of the juvenile. A firsttime violent offender will be placed in a local detention facility, rather than sent to a
long-term out of state facility unless there is such a pressing public safety concern that
the child must be removed from the community. In Ingalls County’s practice, a child who
commits the same offense would likely be sent for one week to a facility the first time
and two weeks the second time.
Once disposition is decided, the judge sets the case on for a non-appearance
review. This means that if the juvenile does not violate probation, then their case will be
reviewed several months later, but the child will not have to appear at that time. The
juvenile leaves the courtroom either to return to custody or, in out of custody cases, to
meet with a probation officer. The probation officer explains the terms of probation,
including where accepted community service sites are, how to contact a probation officer,
and what happens if probation is violated.
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Juvenile trials are similar in many ways to adult trials; the absence of a jury is a
striking exception. Prosecutors and defense attorneys give opening statements, call
witnesses, cross-examine the opposing witnesses, and give closing arguments. The tone
can be somewhat less formal (in some cases opening and closing statements are waived),
but the process is essentially the same. Another substantial difference is the parent.
Parents are allowed to stay with the child for all proceedings, but witnesses are not
supposed to be in court prior to testifying. Parents who are also witnesses present a
problem for the court and are often allowed to stay in the court for the entire trial and
then testify, which would never be allowed in adult court.
Ideologically, disposition is not supposed to be punishment, but rather protection
and rehabilitation. There are, however, some collateral consequences of juvenile
dispositions that can remain with a juvenile into his adult life. Sentencing guidelines in
adult court are based in part upon a point system, which gives longer prison stays to
repeat offenders who have points accrued from earlier crimes. Two juvenile felonies
committed after age fourteen equal one point in adult sentencing. No juvenile with a
felony drug conviction is eligible for federal financial aid. Children who are found guilty
of high-level sex offenses are required to register as a sex-offender for ten years, keeping
them from jobs, military training, and any work involving children.63
While every child has the right to an attorney, petty offenders have no right to
counsel at public expense.64 Petty calendars, therefore, are significantly different from
appearances for more serious offenses. When a young person appears for a petty offense,
the county attorney will meet with him before the court appearance to explain the process
63
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and the child’s rights. No law requires prosecutors to do this, but many judges request it
for reasons of fairness and efficiency. A petty offender represents himself in court, often
with parental assistance. The juvenile can call and question witness and give testimony in
a trial, but without the guidance of an attorney. A child who commits a petty offense is
adjudicated a “petty offender” rather than a “delinquent,” which means that there are less
strict consequences permitted by the law.65

Beyond Juvenile Court
Some juveniles are too young, mentally ill, or cognitively disabled to go through
the court process. A defense attorney, judge, or even a prosecutor can call for a
competency evaluation to see if a juvenile offender, regardless of the severity of the
offense, has the ability to aid in his own defense. A juvenile cannot, “enter a plea, be
tried, or receive a disposition for any offense when the child lacks sufficient ability to:
(A) consult with a reasonable degree of rational understanding with the child’s counsel;
or (B) understand the proceedings or participate in the defense due to mental illness or
mental deficiency.66” If there is a question of competency, the child is sent to the county
mental health center for evaluation. There, a mental health professional tests the child in a
variety of ways to determine if he understands what is happening sufficiently to stand
trial. Most of the time, both sides in a juvenile case accept the findings of the county
mental health professional. Contested competency hearings are rare, but occasionally two
mental health professionals will provide different opinions on a child and then a trial is
held to determine if the child is competent.
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While certain juveniles are too immature to stand trial at all, the law dictates that
others are too dangerous to remain in the juvenile system. In Minnesota, there are two
options for a prosecutor who considers a juvenile unfit for simple juvenile court.
Statutory guidelines provide the criteria for these alternatives, but, unlike some states, the
prosecutor has discretion in asking for them and the judge has complete control over
whether a juvenile will remain in juvenile court or not. In Minnesota, a person under the
age of eighteen who commits an offense automatically lands in juvenile court. In some
states, presumptive certification automatically places young people into adult court for
their initial appearance. The intermediate option between juvenile and adult court is
called extended jurisdiction juvenile (EJJ). EJJ gives older juveniles a chance to stay in
the juvenile system until age 21 with a held adult sentence, which will be imposed if the
juvenile violates probation in any way between the offense and his 21st birthday.67
Certification is the most severe option available to judges in juvenile court. A
juvenile who is certified to adult court will be treated in all ways as an adult. The criteria
for certification are the seriousness of the offense in terms of community protection, the
level of culpability of the child, the child’s prior delinquency record, the child’s
programming history and willingness to participate in programming in the past, the
adequacy of the punishment and programming available in the juvenile justice system,
and the consequences available for the child in juvenile court.68 Prosecutors have
considerable discretion in deciding when to ask for certification. The law demands,
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however, that for certain offenses, such as the use of firearms by older adolescents,
prosecutors always request certification.69

From Rules to Roles
Children will not all experience the court in the same way. Judges have different
personalities and principles, as do the other court professionals. There are, however, some
constant elements, often dictated by statute and rules of procedure, which a young alleged
offender can expect to see when entering a Minnesota juvenile court. These elements tend
to limit the ways in which the court can impose itself upon the child’s life and the life of
the child’s family. Maximum fines and standards for out-of-home placement occur much
more frequently in juvenile court than any minimum requirements related to severity of
offense.
The following chapters examine how juvenile court actors function within this set
of parameters. The professionals are neither entirely unconstrained nor machines
programmed by the institution. Statute alone does not reconcile the conflicting models of
justice that exist in the juvenile court. Human interactions, beliefs and behaviors that
drive the court are not evident in statutes and rules of procedure. Court actors use the
legal framework described in this chapter, but also find discretion in its inability to
address all the conflicts of juvenile justice. The rest of this thesis captures the juvenile
court inside the statutes, which is constrained and limited by its rules, but which is much
richer than the world of legal texts.

69

Minnesota Statute 2007. 260B.125. Subd. 3.

48

Chapter Four:
Constructing the Child
What makes a child different from an adult? What makes a delinquent child
different from a non-delinquent? What separates one-time and repeat offenders? Who and
what make children break the law? Juvenile court actors face these questions each time
they interact with the young people brought into court for breaking the law. While some
questions have empirically testable possibilities, actors within the court rarely have hard
data available to them when they make decisions regarding a particular juvenile’s path
through the court system. Court actors must substitute unavailable statistical evidence
with experience and assumptions about the young people with whom they interact on a
daily basis. Not every court actor shares the same set of assumptions or experiences.
Furthermore, even if every individual within the court subscribed to identical definitions
of their young defendants, there is no guarantee that these definitions would be factually
grounded. This ambiguity’s primary consequence is that the court lacks a static
operational definition of the very thing without which the entire system would vanish: the
child. Legal definitions, which define juveniles as individuals under eighteen for
example, provide only moderately concrete parameters. In the juvenile court’s
operational life, the working definition of juveniles developed by court actors determines
crucial issues within the court, such as proposed strategies for rehabilitation.
This chapter explores the young person that emerges in light of the legal and
philosophical challenges presented in the earlier chapters. How court actors view
adolescents – the subject of their careers – influences how they construct an approach to
juvenile justice that incorporates the adolescent’s experiences, identity, and
understanding. The working definitions of the child and the juvenile delinquent, created
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by court actors, influence two essential elements of the legal process: the way in which
court actors perceive themselves and the way in which they assign blame. In the former,
the identity given to the juvenile determines the extent to which that juvenile ought to be
blamed for his or her offenses. Blame, in this sense, does not always follow the same path
as criminal culpability, so a child could be blamed for an action for which they are not
legally held accountable. More problematic, the child can be held legally accountable for
an action, but for whom some court actors do not assign blame. In the latter, the court
actor’s self-perception is deeply intertwined with how court actors define the juvenile.
The court actor’s role and desired outcomes depend in part upon the kind of relationships
that the court actor constructs between herself and juveniles; relationships, which rely on
the court actor’s assumptions and generalizations.
This chapter addresses the major elements of juvenile identity construction within
the juvenile court. This chapter first explores the personal identity that court actors
ascribe to juveniles in the court. Like a census compiled from personal experience, this
identity includes the race, economic status, family situation, and education. The juvenile
identity also includes more fluid categories like involvement in school activities,
influence from older siblings, and exposure to video games and computers. Naturally,
court actors do not posit that that every child in the juvenile court fits the same
demographic mold. Nevertheless, court actors make certain assumptions about overall
trends in demography, as well as ascribing certain connotations to demographic
information. This chapter also examines a unique aspect of juvenile court, which is the
family. Considerations of the family’s role within the court system, and its culpability in
the juvenile’s situation, are interwoven into the child’s identity. The second half of the
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chapter places the child within the specific context of juvenile court. In this setting, the
court actor’s self-regard confronts her assumptions about the juvenile. This chapter
examines how court actors and juvenile interactions manifest themselves through the
court actor’s definition of juvenile responsibility. Finally, this chapter explores the
paradox provided in the “un-savable” child. This juvenile demonstrates the constraints
provided by legal parameters and institutional rationale that do not match the court
actor’s perceived reality of juvenile identity and of their own identities.

Dumb or Dangerous? Portraits of the Juvenile Delinquent
Not every child becomes a juvenile delinquent, nor do juvenile delinquents
represent a random sample of the Ingalls County juvenile population. Rather, certain
characteristics thread through many children who end up in the legal system. This study
explores the assumptions and generalizations that court actors make about the identity of
a juvenile delinquent, based upon experience rather than exact data. The juvenile identity
includes strict categories like race, gender, and income, but it also includes more fluid
categories like educational involvement.70 Taken together, the ways that court actors
describe the kinds of juvenile they are likely to see in court demonstrates the assumptions
and generalizations that court actors make about delinquents. Court actors tend to gather
large amounts of data about the young person’s life, but ultimately determine if the
juvenile falls into one of two categories, which are based more on the offense than on the
offender. Juvenile court actors tend to group children and their behavior into the
categories – dumb and dangerous – each of which comes with a set of assumptions. Court
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actors, however, collect data about the juvenile that calls into question these categories
and assumptions. Information about life experiences and personal identity enrich the
juvenile’s portrait as seen by adults in the juvenile system. While the court never uses a
purely offense-based vision (as they might in criminal court), court actors sometimes
attempt to condense the young person’s identity into categories that emphasize the
incident, rather than the juvenile’s whole life.
Court actors do not always use the terms “dumb” and “dangerous,” but they tend
to approach certain kinds of behavior with fear and concern, or with a certain level of
tolerance often mixed with condescension. While dumb and dangerous adolescent
behavior may seem overlapping, there is a tendency in juvenile court to view some
juvenile crime as a by-product of normal adolescent development (i.e. “stupid kid stuff”)
and others as symptomatic of deeper social and behavioral issues (i.e. “dangerous
criminal activity.”). This distinction appears in examples, such as, “Even on a robbery I
want to know what’s going on – he wants to buy a new Nintendo or he’s addicted to
meth?” While these categories seem to relate to the offense rather than the child, this
distinction blurs in application. The child who acts in a certain way does so because he
was raised a certain way or because of some element of his personality. Court actors
linked identity with offense-type, as one judge noted:
One particular child, you could probably take away their cell phone and tell
them they can’t play football this season and that child will never do anything
ever again. And another child doesn’t know about cell phones…only how to
steal them…and couldn’t afford the equipment for football, so why go out for
football?...and is more worried about how he’s going to get his next meal and
you say to that person, “I’m gonna take away your cell phone” and you’re
going to be laughed at, I mean that’s ridiculous.
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Court actors in these cases looked to the offense and the child’s identity to form an
opinion about whether the young person constitutes a danger or is simply being a stupid
kid. The offense and why it was committed take precedent over other elements, such as
the child’s race or educational experiences.
Those court actors who define most juvenile delinquent behavior in terms of
dangerous activity alluded to nostalgia for a safer, more innocent time in their
childhoods, which allowed them to frame today’s children as victims of societal
corruption. This nostalgia appears limited to prosecutors, however, and judges and public
defenders seemed skeptical of such analysis. A county attorney said, “Video games make
kids not understand what their violence does and the hand-eye coordination makes them
better shots.” Another county attorney commented, “The kid who says, ‘I’m gonna come
back with my AR-15 and shoot up this school tomorrow!’ Twenty years ago I think we
said, ‘Come on, you got detention.’ Now, ‘Does he have access to an AR-15? Oh my
gosh he does!’ How seriously do we take this?” The same attorney later noted that
changes in violence crime in juveniles were due in part to the fact that:
You can turn on TV and hear swearing and violence and guns that they wouldn’t
have seen fifteen years ago. 15 years ago we’d have been watching Three’s
Company. Now they’ve got these video games, which are sensational and
phenomenal with violence. I mean how many kids had cell phones when I was
in high school? Maybe one. Now it’s just out there and the MySpace and all of
the other stuff they have access to as well as the drugs and guns and other
things, which are more prominent.
Another attorney echoed this belief, by saying that:
There’s stuff happening now that I couldn’t have even imagined when I was a
juvenile. Kids have access to so much more these days. When I was a juvenile I
don’t remember kids doing serious offenses. I had two boys who called a pizza
delivery person with the purpose of not only robbing him, so they could go to
some dance, but taking his pizza because they were hungry. They even ordered
wings! I never would have thought that.
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These court actors allude to the young person’s identity in these comments, but focus on
the their shock at the kinds of offenses being committed. Their nostalgia for an earlier,
safer time ignores the identity differences between the court actors and the juvenile
delinquent and instead emphasizes the differences in behavior.
Other court actors argued that much of the behavior they see in juvenile court is
simply kids being kids. Normal adolescent development, according to some, facilitates
delinquent behavior.71 A public defender stated, “Kids fight. Boys are really aggressive
and they fight.” Another attorney commented, “A lot of them are plagued with the same
things; the alcohol addictions and the drug addictions and that makes them do things that
they maybe wouldn’t normally do.” Judges brought their beliefs about dumb kid behavior
to the juvenile’s attention in court. One judge said to a young delinquent who had just
plead guilty to theft, “Do not do this again, especially not in your sister’s store for crying
out loud.” While the angry adolescent who fights in school because he doesn’t have a
stable home and the juvenile who shoplifts from his sister’s store might appear to have
little in common, court actors often put them together into a group of young people who
are acting out as a symptom of growing up. This behavior might be stupid, but it is not
dangerous in the way that serious escalating crimes are dangerous.
The distinction between stupid kid stuff and dangerous criminal activity, however,
becomes nuanced by the other information gathered by court actors. For example,
individuals involved in juvenile justice across the state of Minnesota and Ingalls County,
currently debate the role of race in juvenile arrest, detention, and disposition.72 The
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child’s personal background factors into many decisions that juvenile court actors make
in Ingalls County, from charging to disposition. Court actors tend to throw a broad net
when constructing a juvenile; they want to know as much about the child as they can. As
one county attorney noted, referencing 5th degree Assault, which is a common offense
among young men, “History is a big thing for me. I read a statute like Assault 5 and
realize that’s not so black and white, every case is so unique.” A judge reiterated the idea
that many factors go into the portrait of a juvenile delinquent. She stated, “I look at home
life, support, mental health issues, and chemical dependency issues, what other treatment
has been tried? What other consequence has been tried? The age. We look at everything
in juvenile.” Even public defenders, whose role is probably most similar to their
counterpart in adult court, need to know the broad history of a youthful client. As one
details:
I want to know how the kid is doing in school, like are they showing up, are they
in special ed, are they having a lot of emotional-behavioral issues? Are they
involved in extra-curricular activities? How they are at home? What kinds of
social things they might be involved in? Also what type of family life have they
grown in? Are we talking about a very chaotic, neglectful family that they have
grown up in where they haven’t had the opportunity to have the structure that
they need growing up?
Juvenile court actors examine a wide variety of factors, which influence how they expect
the young person to behave and what they expect might be an effective remedy. This
deeper picture of who the child is can clash with a simpler notion of what they child does.
In other words, court actors employ both offense and offender-based visions when trying
to assess young people in the juvenile court.
The same court actor might employ a mixed offense and offender-based
assessment of the child when trying to understand the juvenile’s identity and why they
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chose to commit a criminal offense. An important element, which calls into question the
“dumb or dangerous” offense-based distinction, is the juvenile’s life outside of court.
While this is rarely a consideration in adult court, it is of primary concern for juvenile
court actors. This stems from the traditional juvenile justice thesis that society, education
and family determine much of the child’s criminal tendencies.73 A judge said, “These are
kids who don’t have a family, who are in foster care, long-term foster care. Maybe
they’re not even in foster care because they are angry enough that nobody will keep them
and so they end up in delinquency.” A public defender commented that:
When we interview these kids everyone always asks, “are you involved in any
activities in school?” It’s far and few that are involved in athletics or the drama
club. They really need some place to belong, some reason for being there. A lot
of people are down on sports, but that’s crazy, they should be emphasizing that
all the time… The kids that are involved are not the kids that we see.
Similarly, a judge argued that humiliation in school causes children who lack educational
support to act out. To which he added, “The kid who comes in for fighting, I can tell you
why. They don’t know how to read or write.” Another judge commented, “Assault in
school [often happens] by someone who feels they have been wronged or disrespected
and that usually comes in because there have been some racial epithets thrown at them
and they get mad and they end up assaulting.” In the most frank admission to the role of
preconceived assumptions in the court process, a judge said:
Kids of color, whether they are boys or girls, probably have had more contacts
with probation, probably have not had a strong family support, probably have
not had a strong education mindset ingrained into them, are more likely to be
coming before us. Whether it’s gangs or the schools they go to, it’s not cool to
be a good student for a lot of these kids.
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Unlike the dumb or dangerous distinction, these arguments focus on the child’s history,
rather then on his behavior. From this point of view, what the child has done is less
relevant to the court process than what the child has experienced.
While some court actors pointed to external forces that caused young people to
act out, others showed how some problems in the juvenile court stem from disconnects
between the juvenile’s identity and the juvenile court’s expectations. A public defender
stated, “It’s the middle-class model and most of my kids aren’t middle class.” When
asked if juvenile understood all of their rights, a judge responded, “I mean, come on,
these are juveniles…13 years old, parents who aren’t very sophisticated, probably have
very little experience with the law, may not have a lot of education, that kid may not have
a whole lot of education.” Some court actors pointed explicitly to the racial dimension of
juvenile court work. As one public defender noted, “These young black kids are coming
in and getting charged with aggravated robbery and simple robbery that are following
them into adulthood and branding them as major criminals.” In these situations, court
actors argue that the court’s perception of the juvenile determines the success of a case.
They demonstrate how the juvenile’s identity poses a problem within the juvenile court
context. The tension exists not because the young person’s experiences cause him to
commit crimes, but because his identity is at odds with the court’s perception of what he
should be.74
Every court actor does not put equal value on the same elements of juvenile
identity. What is more, in the context of one case, the same court actor might consider
age and education more heavily, while in another case race and family situation seem
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most pertinent. Overall, however, the key elements in juvenile identity seem to include:
education, family situation, age, and race. Juvenile identity is important for two reasons
in the court setting. First, court actors make generalizations about the background and
motivations of future juvenile delinquents based upon assumptions they have regarding
what kinds of juvenile appear in the system. Additionally, individual juveniles may
receive certain treatment based upon assumption the court actors make about “kids like
them.”
These assumptions in turn influence how, and to whom, court actors assign
blame. By distinguishing between “dumb” and “dangerous” young people, court actors
point to society, family, and human nature as, if not perpetrators, at least co-conspirators,
in juvenile delinquency. They also result in vastly different models of justice, some of
which value the offense more than the offender and others, which emphasize the
individual’s experiences more than the particular crime. Young people whose poor
upbringing, lack of education, and adolescent nature compels them to commit stupid
crimes might respond quite differently to community service or out-of-home placement,
than a young person who commits dangerous crimes out of desperation, addiction, or
perceived necessity. Court actors’ assumptions and experiences influence how these
young identities get framed within the court. What appears relevant in the juvenile’s
identity depends upon what court actor’s attitude toward the offense and the offender. It
depends on the offense in so far as the court actors divides “dumb” and “dangerous” kids,
but is complicated by the offender’s life experience (like afterschool programs, home life,
and addiction) and personal characteristics (like class and race).
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Court actors’ visions of the juvenile delinquent also contribute to the court actor’s
self-perception. Court actor’s roles depend largely upon how they perceive their
relationship to the juvenile. The parameters of these relationships between adult and child
depend in part upon how the juvenile is perceived by the adults in the juvenile justice
system. Court actors might identify with juveniles through personal characteristics or life
experiences. On the other hand, court actors might find very little in common with the
young people they see every day. The nature of identification between court actors and
juvenile will be addressed in more detail in the next chapter. After examining the
different ways in which court actors view juveniles, however, it becomes apparent that
court actors frame their relationships with juveniles as larger than the interactions
required by law. In other words, personal interactions between juveniles and adults enrich
the impersonal legal definitions of the court actor’s duty to the juvenile and the court
actor’s formal role in the juvenile justice setting. Court actors construct themselves as
protectors and assignors of blame depending upon their attitudes toward the young people
that they serve. The process of constructing personal identity reveals itself through the
child’s identity, but also through the perceived nature of the child’s family. The next
section expands the range of court actors and juvenile interactions to include the
juvenile’s family, who further complicates this relationship.

Family, Identity, and Court Roles
The parent is a unique actor in juvenile court cases. While most court settings
include judges and attorneys, parents influence juvenile court proceedings much more
than they do adult court proceedings. Parents enter the juvenile system as enforcers,
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advocates, witnesses, moral guides, and contributors to the crime. Formal court actors
confront parental involvement with ambivalence. Parents are too often uninvolved in the
child’s case, yet some parents enable and even encourage their child’s delinquent
behavior. Court actors incorporate parental identity into their construction of blame and
into the court actor’s self-perceptions about roles and limitations. Parents, who are neither
the defendant nor entirely separate from the defendant, provide a dilemma for court
actors who function within a broader criminal justice system that constructs procedure
and punishment around personal responsibility. Unless the parent has done something
that falls under the category of neglect or child abuse, then they escape the juvenile
court’s jurisdiction, leaving the child to incur any consequences that the court prescribes.
How court actors shape the parent’s role within the system constrains how the
court actor shapes her own role. Since parents participate in many steps of the juvenile
court process, but rarely participate in the same way, court actors must adapt to
incorporate parental roles. Unlike probation officers, for example, on whom court actors
can depend to act in certain professionally defined ways, parents are not compelled by
law or profession to adopt any one particular role. Court actors can attempt to influence
parental involvement, but they can also shape the court’s response to parents based upon
generalized categories into which they place specific kinds of parents. Court actors
determine what the parent can do better than the system. They also make assumptions
about what the parent should do, but which the court actually does. Finally, court actors
describe how parents make the court more or less efficient, particularly with regards to
the court actor’s relationship with the juvenile.
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Prosecutors, judges and probation officers often attempt to frame the adults in a
child’s life as the parent-enforcer. This primary defense against delinquency augments
the state’s protective and rehabilitative role by making parents into probation officers. In
this vision, the court’s philosophy and the parent’s philosophy regarding morality and
appropriate behavior align. Court actors provide support for parents who echo their
sentiments, particularly when the parents are unable to fully enforce the values that they
share with the court actors at home. One county attorney commented:
The message is reinforcing to the kid what I am hoping they [parents] already
told them…I love reinforcing a message they have already given. I don’t know
your kid, but here is what I think is going on and to hear them, ‘thank you, thank
you for saying that.’ …And with petty offenders we’re getting that kid the first
time in. Hopefully they didn’t have to come to court, but if they did, it’s our
chance to back up what mom and dad are telling them.

The message may come from an attorney, or more powerfully, it may be made explicit in
the courtroom by the judge. One judge told every parent in his court, “I am going to make
you into a probation officer. If he doesn’t follow the rules, I need you to pick up the
phone and call his other probation officer, okay?” Another judge shared a similar routine:
I try to support the parent. I make the parent be a probation officer…My speech
is, “your parent, Mom or Dad, they get to tell you when you go to sleep, when
you get up, what chores you do, when you leave the house, when you come
home, who you go with, where you go. They need the phone numbers of all of
your friends houses or you can’t go there.” And the kids are usually in shock and
the parents are usually very pleased. And it returns some power to the parent.
A third judge, asked at what times is he most effective, argued:
When I have parents who are willing to step up…I say, ‘look, because of what
your son did, he has turned you into a probation officer. If he doesn’t do what he
is supposed to do, I want you to be calling his other probation officer.’ When the
kid knows that Mom and Dad will pick up that phone; that is when I am most
effective.
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Sometimes, however, parents fall too far on the retributive side of justice. On the
extreme end of parental involvement are those cases where the parent wants the child to
receive a punishment greater than the one suggested by probation officers. In Ingalls
County, one distraught mother said to the public defender, “I am so angry. I know the
theory of it all. I know that he is a teenager doing teenager stuff. He’s not gonna respect
me in my house. I want him to have better structure.” Court actors commented on this
sort of parent, as one judge put it, “The parents may say - No we want him thrown away,
put him in Sing Sing until he’s 18.” Another judge attempted to help parents who felt
incapable of dealing with a difficult child. He said, “I’ve locked kids up just to give the
parents a break…’I’m going to send him away for forty days and at least then you’ll have
some peace.”
Parents can also advocate for their child in the court. Defense attorneys often
point to this as their preferred role for parents, and a role that they see too infrequently.
Even defense attorneys, however, see the challenge of this role because the public
defender represents the child and not the parent. As one public defender said,
“Sometimes that first meeting can be kind of a hostile meeting because the parents are
there and the parents get pissed that they’re not talking to you or you’re not talking to
them.” Judges tend to provide time for the parent to speak on the child’s behalf during a
hearing, and children have a legal right to a parent or guardian with them during all court
proceedings. This puts parents in the position of witness, defendant, and attorney. The
parent assumes the role that a defendant in adult court would take in speaking on behalf
of their child. Particularly in petty cases, where the child does not have a public defender,
the parent’s arguments mimic the response an attorney might give. Individuals outside of
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the justice system most frequently come into contact with the system as a witness, and
parents are often witnesses to their children’s actions. The complex role of parents within
the court, however, leads to situations for which criminal law does not prepare court
actors. A county attorney expressed her frustration at this ambiguity by noting that:
In petty trials, I can’t stand it when (because the kid is the one who is supposed
to ask questions, they are representing themselves) but the parent will sit there
and do kind of a puppet show to tell the kid all of the questions to ask. That
drives me nuts. And sometimes then, at the end, the parent will go up and testify
and if you are in the courtroom you are not supposed to testify.
The worst form of parental interaction in the court system, from the point of view of
individuals within the court, is that of enablement or even collusion in their child’s
criminal action. Unfortunately, court actors often identify this type of involvement as the
most common. Sometimes, the parent’s contribution to the child’s delinquency rests in
their inaction or poor parenting. Many within the court expressed frustration that they
could not compel parents to behave as the court actors believe parents should act. A
mental health professional commented that, “One of the big frustrations is you have kids
who come from a dysfunctional family, they wind up in the court system, you would
really like to be able to have sanctions over the parents and you don’t have it. You can’t
compel parents to go into family therapy or marital counseling or anything else.” A judge
suggested that the best court reform would be to give juvenile court judges the power to
sanction parents for their children’s behavior. He argued:
They brought these kids into this world; maybe they should be responsible doing
the best by them. It should be criminal if they don’t. I’m not talking about
beating them, I’m not talking about neglecting them. I’m talking about
emotional support and with their education and with family values, whatever
your family values are… Give me jurisdiction over the parents, ‘I’m gonna lock
your ass up for thirty days if you aren’t on top of your son if he comes home
with something less than a C on his report card.’ And you watch how many kids
don’t come home with bad report cards after that.
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The roles described above belong to parents who are present in their child’s life.
Many court actors lamented the absence of parents, particularly fathers, in the court.
Some point to the lack of positive role models as an influential factor in a child’s
proclivity for delinquent action. A public defender commented that, “If you come to
hearings, especially detention hearings, there is about 40% who don’t have a parent or
guardian there so the only voice that they have is the public defender.” A judge, who
framed himself repeatedly as a father figure, noted, “Most of the kids don’t come to court
with a dad. There is no dad. There is no male authority figure, no male role model.” A
reoccurring theme amongst court actors was their belief that teaching right from wrong
fell under the jurisdiction of the parent. Many noted, however, that modern parents seem
to have abdicated this role. A judge said:
Even in traditional families where you do have the two parents, one parent is
still probably working on the way home, or whatever they do, other activities.
So the kids are going to learn [acceptable behavior] from their peers and if they
don’t have positive peers they are going to learn behavior that is going to lead
them probably into our court. They’re looking at parents… you’ve got a mother
or a father who is on crack, they’re probably not spending much time worrying
about the child they had that they are supposed to be raising.
Many members of the court system framed their role in part as a replacement for
incompetent parents. Men in the court system felt particularly compelled to provide
‘fatherly’ support for the juveniles whose fathers were absent. A county attorney also
commented on the lack of parenting and the desire to provide parenting, but ultimately
concluded that, “Some kids are there because they haven’t been parented. You want to
help them, you don’t know how; we’re not set up for that.” Another county attorney
stated her role in parenting most actively, “A lot of it is just basic parenting kinds of skills
quite frankly. I think a lot of what we do is teach parents how to parent and parent kids
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that can’t be parented by their parents. Very simple.” A more ambivalent answer came
from a judge, who attempted to convey that she provided some parenting to juveniles
without saying that parents were to blame for juvenile delinquency. “I think teenagers
need the excuse not to act out,” she said, “if they’re not getting it at home – and I don’t
mean to blame parents, because I don’t agree with that, although some people do, I don’t
– I am hoping to let them know that somebody is watching and somebody cares about
their safety and their behavior.”
The attitudes of court actors toward parental involvement show that the parent’s
involvement or lack of involvement constitutes a crucial element of the juvenile court
experience even if parents do not hold formal legal roles within the court. Not every
parent, however, serves the same role within the court. Some act as enforcers and
advocates – mimicking most clearly the professional court actor’s role. Other parents act
as witnesses or contributors to the offense. These roles more closely resemble those that
non-professionals might play in adult court. The mix of formal and in-formal roles within
the juvenile court leads to ambiguities that other courts escape. Parents bridge the gap
between child and adult, insider and outsider, sharing common elements with the child
and the court actors. In response, court actors define their roles around those of the
parent. The court’s role in raising juveniles depends in part upon whether or not the court
actor believes that parents are filling their roles.
In some cases parents also provide alternative sources of culpability. Nonresponsible juveniles included those children whose upbringing did not equip them to
handle questions of morality in a socially acceptable manner. A county attorney noted
some children might say, “Well it’s ok to fight, my mom and dad fight, I’ve seen my dad
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do that, I only hit him once, my dad says it’s ok to hit somebody once.” To which the
attorney added, “He’s been raised wrong, so he’s not responsible.” Juvenile responsibility
and parental responsibility do not always fall into clean, definable spheres. Court actors
must contend with contributing factors from many camps when determining where they
should assign blame. The following section explores how court actors deal with
ambiguous responsibility in juvenile court.

The Child is Responsible for His Actions
Responsibility lies at the heart of the justice system. Proving guilt means proving
responsibility; yet there are many levels of responsibility, some of which do not entail
criminal culpability.75 Children further complicate the question of responsibility because
their developmental levels blur the line between causation, responsibility, and culpability.
As demonstrated in the earlier section on juvenile identity, how the juvenile chooses to
behave reveals his identity in different ways than demographic or personal characteristics
might. How court actors treat the delinquent child depends in part upon the ways in
which they see the child as having control over his or her actions. To better understand
the nature of juvenile responsibility as seen in the court, each interviewee was asked,
“When I say that this child is responsible for his or her actions, what does that mean to
you?” Few responses, however, provided the same information about juvenile
responsibility. This demonstrates one of the leading ambiguities within the juvenile
justice system. Courts presume that adults, excluding the mentally ill, bear responsibility
for crimes that they commit. Laws in juvenile court function under the same assumptions
regarding children; only the mentally ill or the very young are exempt from consequences
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related to their actions.76 People within the juvenile court, however, regard the child with
more nuance than one might find in the law. Responsibility does not mean the same thing
for each child. Responsibility appears at several steps along the path from action to
consequence. The court assigns responsibility from pragmatic reasons, such as in order to
prevent the child from repeating the offense, and for philosophic reasons, such as the
belief in personal choice. This section addresses three elements of juvenile responsibility
with the court. The first element deals with personal choice, the second with the power of
admitting guilt, and the third with the court’s role in assigning responsibility.
Most interviewees distinguished juveniles with no capacity to tell right from
wrong from other children. These young people who are so mentally ill or cognitively
disabled that they cannot understand the concept of “good” and “bad” are removed from
the juvenile court setting. Most young people, however, can tell right from wrong in
some capacity according to juvenile court actors. Court actors provided varying
interpretations of responsibility among those children who could tell right from wrong.
One theme within the responses was choice. While at other points, court actors were
willing to argue that juveniles do not employ full agency, when it came to direct
participation in criminal action, some members of the community made no distinction
between juveniles and adults. As one prosecutor said:
Really it boils down to: did they know right from wrong, can they distinguish
right from wrong and did they enter the wrong path knowing it? At any point I
can walk away from a fight and I remember being a fifth grader and being in
fights that I probably should have walked away from and I was responsible for
what I did.
A judge gave a similar analysis, but framed it in terms of societal expectations, as well as
legal right and wrong:
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It means that the child understands the difference between right and wrong. The
kid understands how they are supposed to function in our society. They know
they’re supposed to be in school versus being truant, they know they’re not
supposed to be using alcohol or drugs and remaining sober, they know they’re
not supposed to be having non-consensual sex.
Even in cases where documented disabilities or severe economic hardship play a role in
determining the child’s culpability, some viewed this more as a crutch than a legitimate
excuse. One county attorney commented, “I am amazed what kids can pull themselves
out of. Horrible circumstances are no excuse. I don’t care how crappy your life is. You
don’t clunk an old lady on the head.” A judge recounted the story of one of his juvenile
cases to demonstrate his contention that most kids are responsible for what they do:
There was a thirteen year-old boy whose mom came into court and said, “He has
emotional problems, he is developmentally delayed, while he knows the
difference between right and wrong, he doesn’t appreciate the ramifications.” I
said, “I disagree with your mom on that because you go off when you are in
situations that you don’t like and you don’t get your way. You don’t want to be
in court this morning, but you know there are rules in this courtroom. You’re
following the rules here, but you don’t want to be here. That tells me that you
know the difference between right and wrong and you chose when to follow the
rules. It may be more difficult at times to control how you’re feeling. You can’t
control how you feel, but you can control what you do. It may be more difficult
at times to control what you do, but you can.” See, the kid is responsible.
Choosing to act in a way that one knows is wrong defines much of juvenile (and adult)
responsibility. Some court actors did not attempt to nuance this belief any further,
arguing that the child either is responsible or he is not responsible and, therefore, no
longer in the hands of the juvenile court.
Ignoring the question whether or not the juvenile is legally responsible, some
members of the court look to the value of a child admitting that he or she is responsible.
Some contend that a guilty plea, even when there are mitigating factors, which make the
child less responsible than an adult would be in that situation (i.e. peer pressure, threats
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from older children or adults, limited cognitive ability etc.), gives the child ownership of
the act and allows him or her to see the value of the court’s consequences. These
individuals viewed the child’s answer to the question “Am I [the child] responsible?” as a
crucial factor in the court process. A prosecutor noted, “That they are taking
responsibility for it, that they are owning what they did, I would say that’s a positive
thing. My reaction to that is ‘good!’ that means they get it, that means, we’ve got a
chance with them.” On the other hand, a public defender saw this as problematic in a
system where the best legal move might not be admitting responsibility, “If the child is
pleading guilty and they did commit the crime, then they’re owning up to it. It’s fine that
they are being responsible for their actions. However, I get very uptight when they enter
pleas of not guilty and I hear ‘oh they’re not taking responsibility for their actions.’” The
public defender emphasized that every juvenile has the right to plead not guilty and that
in some cases that is the best legal choice even when the young person is guilty.
Court actors also framed responsibility not as something that the child has, but
something that the court gives the child. In other words, responsibility depends less upon
the offense or upon the elements leading up to the offense, but on whether or not the
court provides consequences for the action. Asked, “What is your reaction to this child is
responsible for his or her actions,” a judge responded, “Every action has a consequence,
whether it is positive or negative action. And my first reaction to that sentence is that the
child has a consequence for their behavior; they are responsible for it.” A public
defender’s first reaction to the question was to inquire, “The judge saying that or the
prosecutor saying that or you saying that?” Another public defender noted, “It’s usually
the court or somebody saying he is responsible for what he does.”
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How does a child become responsible? Does it have to do with the child’s
developmental level at the moment of the offense, with how the child perceives the
offense, or how the court assigns consequences? Court actors mark the moment of
responsibility at different points along the path from offense to consequence. Still, most
court actors contended that most of the time children have a choice to act in accordance
with the law or not. Responsibility, however, does not always mean culpability in the
eyes of the law, particularly for court actors who lack to power to determine whether or
not a juvenile has committed a legally punishable offense. While determinations of
responsibility do not translate directly to adjudication, court actors make choices
influenced by their opinions regarding juvenile responsibility, such as whether the
juvenile can and should be helped in the juvenile court. The next section explores the
possibility that some juveniles cannot be helped by the juvenile court at all.

The “Un-Savable” Juvenile
Overall, members of the Ingalls County Juvenile Court expressed optimism about
helping children overcome the struggles of childhood to become law-abiding adults. Most
insisted that children adapt more easily than adults, are less set in their ways, and can thus
benefit from the programs provided by the court. Actors from all sides of the system
argue that most juveniles in the community will never need to go through the court
system at all and they estimate that about 80% of young people act with law-abiding
behavior after only one or two court interventions or with no intervention from the court.
This number may or may not have statistical truth, but it demonstrates the perception of
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actors within the court that children generally benefit from rehabilitation. A judge
recounted the story of how such a percentage may have come about:
There is a county commissioner, now deceased… who used to say, talking about
kids… ‘There are 80% that you will never have a problem with, they’ll go about
their life, they’ll graduate, they’ll become somewhat productive, they may not
be the most brilliant, but they are going to get through school and no other
resources are going to be necessary. Out of the other 20%, there will be 10%
that you see and you will make a difference. They won’t come back. They will
come in once or twice and then the school or the kid or the family, something
clicks that the child gets it and you don’t see them again. There are the other
10%, 5% you will see over and over and over again and they will be lucky to
make it to 25 without being in prison or dead. The other 5% there is no hope
for.’

This raises the question: what happens to the 10-20% that the system can’t change?
Are they given the wrong programming, through incompetence or insufficient resources?
Undoubtedly, there are children who slip through the cracks of the system. The issue,
however, is complicated by the notion that there are un-savable children. Exceptions to
the optimistic, rehabilitative philosophy of juvenile court actors reveal the pragmatic
layer of juvenile court philosophy and demonstrates most clearly the moments when the
juvenile system appear in conflict with the people it serves, because the court’s founding
institutional rationale contends that all children can be saved. The current law, however,
provides an escape for court actors who meet juveniles for whom they have no hope. The
alternative for juveniles for whom court actors have given up hope of reform is
certification to adult court. In criminal court, the un-savable adult could be permanently
incarcerated or sent to a mental health facility to protect the community and the defendant
from uncontrollable criminal behavior. In juvenile court, those options are unavailable; a
young person can be sent to a juvenile facility for short stays, but they are released when
they age out of the court’s jurisdiction. Additionally, in traditional juvenile court
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philosophy, there is no formal recognition that un-savable children exist. The court, in
recent years has attempted to change this belief through programs like certification to
adult court, but the fundamental principle that all children can be saved remains in the
court.77 As one prosecutor commented, "There is something optimistic or even naive
about me that I like to see the hope. I like to see that for juveniles they still have a chance
to change their life around." The existence of un-savable children goes against the core
principles of the court, which provides a unique challenge for members of that court, if
they do believe in their existence.
Some court actors aligned more or less with the juvenile court philosophy that courts
cannot give up on children. On that end of the spectrum, one prosecutor said, “I think
there are very few that I would give up on completely. And the ones I give up on
completely, it’s not that they’re bad, it’s that something is wrong…Thank God there are
very few of them.” On the other end of the spectrum, a mental health professional said:
I’ve seen a fair number that are not [savable]. They go to prison. I mean if you
get people who have had a lot of juvenile interventions who are committing
nasty crimes and they’ve got an escalating pattern. What else are you going to
do? Up to a point you’d like to respect the rights of the juveniles, but after a
while you also have to protect society. If you feel that people are going to
continue to be a menace no matter how much intervention they’ve had in the
past, that’s the role.
A county attorney concurred with this assessment of un-savable delinquents, saying:
For the 90-plus percent of kids who really aren’t going to re-offend or are not
going to pose a threat to public safety, get them the service and do as much
intervention possible so that we don’t see them again. For the seven to ten
percent who are frequent flyers, there is a small number who just simply need to
be incarcerated because they are such a risk to public safety.
Judges faced probably the most difficult choice in determining if a child can be
rescued through the juvenile court. Their attitudes influence whether the juvenile will
77
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remain in juvenile court, whether he will be kept through extended jurisdiction juvenile,
or if he will be certified to adult court. The range of responses from judges show that if
these attitudes do affect whether the child goes to adult court, then which judge presides
over a case will have deep ramifications for the juvenile. On one end of the spectrum, a
judge said that, “There are some kids that are so anti-social that it’s like stories of people
who have been raised by wild animals. You can’t get the wildness out of them. How are
you going to make a difference?” This opinion shows the lack of faith that some judges
have in the system to address the needs of its most troubled juveniles. Some court actors,
however, have not lost faith in the basic principle that all children have the potential to
change and be helped back to law-abiding behavior through juvenile court intervention.
On this end, a judge framed un-savable juveniles in terms of possibility, “There are
certainly plenty of kids that I can’t help right now. Hopefully as they go through things,
as they experience consequences, as they make mistakes, they think about maybe
something that I’ve said.”
Juvenile justice in Ingalls County in the 21st century shows how the idealism of
the early juvenile court has transformed into a pragmatic, hybrid system. Court attitudes
reflect this gap between juvenile justice philosophy and realism. Even the prosecutor who
believed that all children could return to the path of law abiding behavior admitted that
she might be naïve in believing that. Some children, it seems, threaten the community to
such an extent that juvenile court cannot restrain them. Juvenile court actors seem to
prefer that young people stay young people and remain within the jurisdiction of the
juvenile system, yet court actors also admitted that some juveniles inhabit a realm beyond
the reach of juvenile court services. Institutional changes, such as the addition of
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certification and extended jurisdiction juvenile provide more flexibility for court actors,
but they still confront the powerful appeal of the rehabilitative model when dealing with
individual young people.

Conclusion
The juvenile court provides several significant instances of legal ambiguity,
which lead to varied perceptions of role, identity, and blame. Individuals within the court
construct the child and their own roles within a framework of experience, attitudes, and
legal constraints. While the visions of juvenile vary, there are certain constants that reveal
how court actors attempt to reconcile institutional philosophy with operational reality.
Court actors support arguments about personal responsibility, which is a key element of
criminal law, but also blame societal corruption for juvenile delinquency, echoing
Progressive reform philosophy. They adapt formal court roles to fit the needs of a
particular child and to co-exist with the informal roles filled by parents. They mix hope
for the rehabilitation of every child with fear that some children are too dangerous to
save.
These ambiguities help form court actor’s perceptions of blame within and
outside the legal context. Interacting within a legal framework, most court actors ascribe
blame to juveniles, contending that they hold responsibility for the choices they make.
Many court actors, however, also assign blame to parents and society. Blaming poor
parenting or violent video games for a child’s misbehavior may seem cliché. Within the
legal context blame outside of the child’s personal choices reveals the constant
constraints put upon legal actors who have no control over the larger context of a child’s
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life. Legally, court actors may only remedy the effects of poor parenting by removing the
child from his home. This response punishes the child more than parents and, in
delinquency court, depends upon the seriousness of the offense and not upon whether or
not court actors believe that the parent is in part to blame. Thus, court actors create a
system, which emphasizes personal choice, but that also attempts to incorporate the
parent more fully into the process in ways that the court actors can control.
Court actors create self-defined roles within the juvenile justice system, which
are deeply influenced by the constraints of their power to hold non-juveniles accountable.
They adopt a parental role, a teaching role, and a bridging role that do not come from the
broader professional identity of judge, attorney, or officer of the court, but from their
experiences within the specific context of juvenile justice. The parental role extends court
actor’s power to interact with the child in a way that many court actors view as pre-legal
and necessary for the child’s moral and social development. Their teaching and bridging
roles supply the topic of the following chapter, wherein I examine how court actors
construct the legal process in a way that appears understandable and just to the child.
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Chapter Five:
Guiding the Child to Justice
The young person’s experience in criminal law provides ample opportunity for
rehabilitative and punitive, offender and offense-based justice to collide. While many
juvenile delinquency procedures mimic those of adult criminal court, court actors modify
the process through language and identification with the juvenile in order to provide a
juvenile-specific justification for the legal system. Court actors who work in juvenile
court confront different problems than their counterparts in adult criminal court. Juvenile
court actors attempt to explain the legal system and create identification because of their
perception that juveniles do not comprehend the norms and purposes of criminal law.78
While adult defendants may not fully understand these principles either, the legal system
functions in part through shared understandings of certain concepts and terms, such as
guilt, the judge, and the right to remain silent. This shared understanding lends legitimacy
to the legal process, which becomes problematic in the juvenile context.79 Children
understand these ideas differently than adults because they do not possess the life
experiences and cognitive functioning of the normal adult. Court actors become
translators between the child and the foreign, adult legal world. The previous chapter
suggests how juvenile court actors perceive young people. This chapter will explore how
court actors envision the juvenile’s experience in the justice system.
This chapter shows how, in Ingalls County, court actors attempt to create a sense
of justice that young defendants can access by constructing juvenile-specific approaches
within the formal legal process. Their approach, which incorporates the court actors’
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vision of the young person (addressed in Chapter Four), balances the conflicting elements
of juvenile justice. While formal statutory and procedural distinctions exist between
juvenile and adult court, the juvenile-specific approaches detailed in this study go beyond
the formal structure in order to address how the individual child understands law.
Through competitive and collaborative relationships among court actors, various
professionals assert their connection with the juvenile while the group maneuvers the
juvenile toward a fair result. Individuals position themselves within the competing
concepts of juvenile justice by deciding, for example, how to justify consequences to a
young person. This position can conflict with other actors’ positions, thus leading to
competition for the juvenile’s trust or attention. Meanwhile, the court group adopts a
guiding role for a juvenile through legal processes, created and implemented by adults.
Ingalls County court actors incorporate juvenile-specific approaches into the
formal legal structure in four significant steps. This chapter follows these four steps by
which the court actors constructs the court based upon the juvenile’s experience. First,
the court actors recognize and confront the presumption in many legal procedures that all
participants in the system, including the defendant, are peers. This step shows how court
actors identify the specific challenges of working with defendants who have a different
kind of relationship with authority. Second, the court actor attempts to translate the
substantive law into terms that young people can understand. Strategies employed by
court actors serve to determine the extent to which a child understands the situation; this
either reveals the juvenile incompetence or bring the juveniles understanding in line with
the court’s meaning. Third, court actors confront the unique youth perspective because
they want the juvenile to see – and accept – the system’s justice. Fourth, Court actors
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demonstrate their role as guide and translator through the justice system in part through
their assertions of identification with the juvenile. Yet, intriguingly, identification can
become a zero-sum game, where court actors compete for connections with the young
people that they serve.

Children and Authority
At home, at school, on the bus, young people spend most of their lives listening to
adults tell them what to do. Many learn from an early age to do what the “grown-up”
says. This interaction might work relatively well with babysitters and teachers, but in
juvenile court it is more problematic. For those adults in roles which require authority for
the safety of the child and where the child’s best interest is (at least in theory) the sole
motivator, knowing that the young person will obey and always tell the full truth can be
crucial. In court, however, the child’s best interest is not always the sole concern. Legal
processes build upon the assumption that interactions between legal professionals and
defendants are interactions of peers in some important ways. In this case, “peers” means
two citizens; people who, outside of the courtroom, have legal equality. In juvenile court
this peer relationship does not exist and in its place is an adult-child relationship, whose
particular power dynamic is not formally recognized in the law. Court actors contend that
an adult’s perception of the legal system varies significantly from the child’s perception
when it comes to their relationship to legal authority figures. Consequently, court actors
attempt to reframe their own roles to negotiate the peer relationship implicit in the law.
The right against self-incrimination provides a striking example of how
foundational legal principles have dramatically different meaning in juvenile court. The
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right to remain silent poses a particular challenge for juvenile court because young people
are often required to incriminate themselves at home, at school, and in other positions
where adults control the situation. In most incidents that occur outside of the juvenile
court, adults don’t impose punishments with the constitutional rights of the accused in
mind. As a mental health worker noted, “Kids are much more acquiescent, especially the
younger ones. They have less of an understanding of their Miranda Rights, things like
that. They are more likely to adhere to authority figures.” A public defender commented
on the frustration that she feels with regards to the application of Miranda Rights and
juveniles:
They always confess. Kids are taught to talk to adults. ‘Police are your friends,
they’re just trying to help you.’ I think for the most part police are trying to
help you, but if you are charged with a crime you have a little bit of a different
relationship with that officer. From that standpoint they’re not your friends no
matter what they tell you. But kids are always told to do what grownups say
and that’s why they always talk.
Another public defender agreed, saying, “It’s hard because kids are very concrete
thinkers at this point, so it’s hard for them to get abstract about the right to remain silent
and that the authority figure won’t hold it against them if they keep their mouth shut.”
Court actors, however, do not all have the same role with regards to juveniles. For some,
young people are not clients or wards, but defendants to be prosecuted. While
professional roles do not entirely determine the court actor’s perception of juveniles, it
does constrain their possible perceptions. A prosecutor noted, “Kids are just as smart as
adults, they might be more impulsive, but when it comes to knowing their rights and what
is a good deal they figure it out just as quickly. It’s a myth that kids don’t understand
their rights.” The child’s unique experience with Miranda Rights reveals the ambiguity
and contradiction of juvenile court. The written law and some court actors presume that
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rights are more than a formality and that defendants possess a minimal understanding of
what their rights mean. Juveniles experience rights differently because of their status in
society as a ward, rather than a full citizen. Court actors define their roles in part around
this different experience of rights, but must still function within a system that presumes
that those rights are understood.
Complications occur even in non-adversarial child-adult interactions within the
court setting. One public defender commented, “It’s hard because a lot of the kids want
me to make the decisions for them, so I just pull back and say I can’t do it.” In this case,
the public defender adopts the role of advocate, rather than guide, which is often difficult
when her clients lack decision-making experience. Some court actors attempt to envision
themselves through the eyes of the juvenile so as to anticipate the juvenile’s response to
the court actor’s role. Sometimes, there are unintended elements that the juvenile
perceives which are not conducive to the court actor’s purpose. One judge commented
that in his role as an authority figure, “whether you’re a big judge or a little judge in
terms of physical presence, when you’re sitting up on the bench with your black robe on
with shoulder pads, you look pretty big anyway.” In a similar vein, a judge commented
that it is difficult to connect with juveniles because, “There’s too much stuff going on
with kids. I’m just this old guy in a black robe who is talking down at them.”
While in these cases, court actors may lament the inherent distance between adult
and child, in other situations court actors benefit from the hierarchy within juvenile court.
Sometimes, court actors want young people to feel at ease, but in other circumstances,
they want the young person to fear the court. Public defenders do not express any interest
in scaring young people, although they noted the power that adults can have over young
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people. As one public defender noted, “You know as an adult that you can get a kid to do
or say about anything. You don’t have to be very smart to figure that out or to do it. They
are easily manipulatable.” Prosecutors, judges and even mental health workers, however
commented on the value some fear and mystery in the court. A prosecutor noted,
“Sometimes the fear of court is a good thing,” a judge adding that sometimes, “I’m
hoping to scare them a little.” The court does not break into two camps, those who want
to make the young person comfortable and those who want to scare him. Individuals who
also take time to explain the process to young people also utilize fear when the situation
calls for it. A mental health worker said that he distinguishes between cases where he
explains the court process to a young client and those situations where, “sometimes a kid
needs to be scared, them I’m not going to warn him.” He added, however that there are
times when he feels that a judge might be too strict with a young person, to which the
mental health worker will say, “He’s gonna act real mean, but really he’s nice,” in order
to balance out the judge’s attitude. A judge distinguished the kind of threat that he would
use with a young person that would not be appropriate or effective with an adult. He
would use language like, “I’m gonna put my foot up your behind and snap it off if you
don’t take care of business” with a juvenile. Court actors evoke fear in juveniles in order
to keep them from coming back to court. They take advantage of the inequality between
child and adult in order to protect and help the young person and also to circumvent
future crimes.
In adult court, the power relationship between judge, attorney, and adult defendant
is unequal, but each individual shares equal status under the law. Whatever the social
status differences, adults share a relationship to each other quite different from the adult-
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child relationship. Court actors respond to the contradiction between law and juvenile
defendant by modifying their roles to address the criminal and the child. This requires
new strategies for guiding the young person through an adult-dominated legal system, so
that the young person may find justice, while the fundamental legal principles remain
intact.

Explaining the Rules
Law is complicated. Most adult defendants do not understand the nuances of
jurisprudence, statutes, and procedures, which is why trained and paid professionals
navigate this complex field for their clients. Even without the assistance of an attorney,
adult defendants are presumed to have a certain functional understanding of basic legal
concepts like juries or guilt. Adults who are cognitively impaired to the point that they
cannot comprehend these basic concepts tend to be found incompetent to stand trial.
Legally, the same standard exists for juveniles. Young people have less developed
abilities to think abstractly and determine what is in their best interests, they also lack the
education and life experience that comes with age. Since it would be impossible for all
young people to be found incompetent, court actors employ strategies to explain court to
young people in terms that they will understand, strategies that allow the juvenile court to
treat children as children while also treating them as delinquents. In doing so, court actors
attempt to make law accessible to young people so that they can impose legally justifiable
consequences.
People working with juveniles frequently simplify the legal system and employ
tactics, which incorporate the juvenile’s sphere of understanding into the complex legal
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world of the court. Court actors translate legal terms and ideas because, as one judge
commented, “A child will have no idea about my language. They may not understand the
word ‘arraignment’ they may not know what ‘disposition’ means. They might think it’s
some kind of medical term, who knows?” In order to combat the inherent confusion in a
system where the defendants and the court speak different languages, some juvenile court
actors reject the court’s jargon entirely when communicating with juveniles. A public
defender says, “I try to break it down. So instead of constantly talking about crossexamination, I say we can ask the witnesses questions and instead of testimony, I will say
someone will come in and talk about what happened.” A judge adds, “I say ‘do you
understand me?’ I say that a lot. ‘Am I being clear? Is this clear to you? Do you
understand me?’” A prosecutor argued that, “Usually a lot of it is getting them to explain
it back to me, not in my words.” These strategies circumvent a complex legal language,
but they also justify the rules written in that language so that they can employ them
without seeming arbitrary to the child – who cannot understand why the rule is there if he
cannot understand what it means.
In the courtroom, judges articulate important concepts to juvenile defendants,
particularly in petty misdemeanor cases where the child does not have an attorney to
explain the rules. In a small, Ingalls County courtroom, one judge repeated the word
“choice” when ascertaining the juvenile’s plea, stating, “You have a choice to make at
this point. You can either deny the charges and then the state would have to prove that
you did it beyond a reasonable doubt or you can plead guilty. I’m not going to force you
one way or another, but you have to make a choice.” Another judge used a similar
technique saying, “You want to plead guilty today because you are guilty right? No one
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forced you to plead guilty.” Another judge stressed the child’s freedom to act as he chose,
saying, “You are able to do whatever you want in that regard, but I need to hear your
choice.” Judges emphasized choice to juveniles so that the young person would better
understand that he did not have to do what his parent or the judge told him to do, but
what he freely chose to do based upon the offenses he had committed. This language
gives the young person ownership in the process, but also places the responsibility upon
the juvenile to make his own life choices.
By translating law into understandable language, court actors incorporate cultural
referents that are not generated through the legal system. Sports and popular culture add
meaning and context to a foreign system, but also add new layers of meaning over which
lawmakers have little control. One prosecutor, to explain his relationship to the defendant
states, “If we were playing football, I’d be offense and you’d be defense.” One public
defender adds, “I ask them about Judge Judy or if they have ever seen Law and Order.
There are so many of those shows that most of the time they have.” Another public
defender echoes this strategy, saying, “If they haven’t been in court before I see if they
have ever watched a trial on T.V.” She added a hint of doubt to this approach, however,
saying, “I think I need new strategies, because I’m not sure mine are working.” Analogies
and cultural references illuminate abstract law for young people who lack developed
abilities to think abstractly. Concrete examples allow young people to apply their
situations to situations that they understand and with which they feel comfortable, such as
the rules of a football. It also allows provides them with an idea of what the court
experience might be like, an experience many of them have never encountered before. On
the other hand, the juvenile court process is less clearly linked to law as it is written, but
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rather meaning that the child and court create. Rather than following lawmakers’ choices
about what language best expresses a legal concept, individual court actors make that
choice for themselves. In doing so, the court actor retains some elements of the original
statutory intent, but might lose other elements of the law’s original meaning. For
example, if a court actor uses Judge Judy as an example, then she includes the parts about
the Television show that are the same as the juvenile court experience (the judge as
arbiter of justice, the adversarial system, the rules of evidence), but also the elements that
differ (the specific laws that are applied, the unique approach of a particular judge).
Explaining the rules to a juvenile is not always as simple as asking him if he has
seen Judge Judy. What the juvenile knows and who teaches him can be strategic legal
choices. One prosecutor abdicates the educational role, explaining, “It’s the public
defender’s job to explain to him what’s going on.” Public defenders, however, may have
good reason – as advocates – for their client to understand the system: children can be
found incompetent to stand trial if their cognitive functioning prevents comprehension of
the system. Sometimes, the court determines that a juvenile is not competent, but would
be competent with some education about the justice system. One public defender put it
plainly, “We’re not going to educate him. We don’t want him to be competent. Educate
him so that the state can prosecute him? So, I leave that to somebody else. They wanted
us to do that and I said we would never agree to that.” The adversarial system in this case
prevents the child’s educational development. The court’s first purpose is to provide a
just outcome, not to teach young people about the law. In cases where the young person
is strategically left in the dark, however, the court actor risks that the young person
misunderstands why he is in court and what happens to him while he is there. Although it
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might save the young person from legal consequences for his behavior, not explaining the
process inhibits the likelihood that the young person will find the system anything but
arbitrary.
Court actors choose strategies for incorporating the juvenile into the legal system:
including elements of both rehabilitative and punitive justice. They tailor their language
to fit the needs of the people they serve, which demonstrates the traditional juvenile court
practice of child-specific language and discretion for individual court actors. Ingalls
County court actors choose to protect the child and acknowledge the differences between
child and adult by guiding the child through the legal process. Punitive elements of
juvenile court appear as court actors reinforce punishment and adversarial justice;
justifying this system to the juvenile by explaining the adversarial and consequencebased nature of law. In some cases, the child’s understanding of the juvenile justice
system becomes a legal strategy. The court actors power over language and
communication techniques represents one of the places most open to discretion, where
the individual control’s the law’s power.

Communicating Fairness
“That’s not fair!” is a complaint that many parents and teachers have heard. From
a child’s point of view, adult decisions might seem arbitrary and, thus, unjust. By the
time that the judge gives disposition in a delinquency case, there have been myriad
opportunities for the young defendant to feel confused, excluded, or unfairly treated. The
probation department’s programming for that young person may be considerably less
effective if the juvenile does not understand why he is there and what this consequence
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has to do with his past actions. Laws (both constitutional and juvenile court-specific) and
internal standards within the county attorney’s office and probation provide guidelines
for how the court treats young people. To an outside, adult observer, these guidelines
prevent dispositions from being entirely unjust and arbitrary. Yet, young people may not
be able to comprehend the fairness that adults identify. For the juvenile to accept the
justice in a particular outcome, court actors demonstrate that the child needs to
understand why adults made certain decisions and to feel some control over the outcome.
Court actors attempt to translate the kind of procedural fairness that adults can often
comprehend into a kind of justice that young people understand.
The court actors in Ingalls County emphasized their commonly held view that
juveniles comprehend justice when the court draws clear lines between action and
consequence. A prosecutor noted, “The judge told him, ‘how are you going to feel if you
find out a little girl has been shot or a little boy playing in his neighborhood has been shot
with one of the guns that you sold?” This type of link, frequently made in hearings,
between the young person’s choice and bad things that could happen as a result begins to
justify the court process to the juvenile by showing how the young person made choices
that brought him into the court’s control. In court, a judge said to a juvenile who had just
plead guilty, “The fact is you could have left the fight and gone in the other direction.”
Another judge commented that she often asks, “What could you have done differently?”
Court actors who argue for or impose consequences upon a young person seek to explain
and justify those consequences to the young person. Court actors in the modern juvenile
court justify consequentialism to young people in part in order to incorporate more
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punishment-based arguments into the juvenile court model. Individuals take the first step
in that process by helping the child understand why what he did was wrong.
Action and consequences apply to the consequences of a criminal act, but also to
what happens in the court. As a prosecutor mentioned the court is most effective “if they
really know we’re watching and paying attention and we will do what we say we do. We
meet with them at the beginning and say ‘if this kind of behavior continues, that is what
is going to happen and lo and behold it happens. Then we give credibility to the system.”
By showing the young person how actions lead to consequences, court actors explain the
basic concept of retributive justice to young people. Several judges make informal verbal
contracts with young people to reinforce the link between the young person’s choices and
the consequences that follow. One judge said, “If I give a kid a break the first time, I
write on the file ‘do not come back.’ That tells me that I told that child, ‘this is your first
time in court, I never want to see you again, you figure it out and if you come back do not
ask for a break.’ So when I see that kid come in and they see me and go ‘oh shit’ they
know that they had an understanding with me.” Another judge described a similar
system:
I get them to make a promise that they do the things the have to do on
probation and that they aren’t going to come back…. I write in the file
‘promises made’ and I tell them at the time, ‘look I’m writing down promises
made, do you know what that means? It means you just made a promise to me
and I am making a promise to you, if I see you in court again I’m going to lock
you up. So when they come back I say, ‘We made a promise, I told you one of
us was going to keep the promise. I hoped it was you. You didn’t keep your
promise, so what’s the argument here?
These promises allow court actors to frame punishment as the inevitable results of the
child’s choices. They empower the child, but also bring to bear on them a retributive
system that links action with punishment, rather than treatment.
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Consequentialist arguments work best, some court actors argue, when young
people understand the system. Comprehension leads to acceptance of the justice model
that court actors propose. Fundamentally, one judge argued, “The consequence doesn’t
work for somebody who doesn’t know what they did. And we know that when we are
training young people, and animals…if they don’t know why you are upset with them,
they don’t know how to change their behavior.” A prosecutor commented, “I always tell
them I am not setting them up to fail. I want everything that they are ordered to do to be
clearly articulated and ordered in court so that way the juvenile knows everything they
need to do to stay out of prison. Because I don’t want to set them up to fail, I don’t want
them to say ‘well I didn’t know about that’.” In one court session, a judge explained his
rationale for sending a young defendant to an out of home placement, saying, “I don’t
like doing it, you’re not going to like being there, hopefully it’s going to be a wake-up
call.” As was explored in the previous section, the juvenile experiences many
opportunities for confusion in the court. Court actors avoid seeming arbitrary by
explaining every step of the legal process. Transparency, in the juvenile court, requires
active participation of the part of court actors to include the young person in the system.
Disposition provides the greatest opportunity to link actions and consequences and to
detail the reasons why a young person must receive certain treatments and punishments.
Court actors report that not only giving full information, but also giving the young
person the power to make choices helps him to “buy into” the system’s fairness. Even
when the juvenile does not truly have a choice, court actors stressed the power of
alternatives. One judge explained the value of the threat, “do you want to live at home or
do you want to live elsewhere?” That the young person, “almost always want to live with
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their parents. I say, ‘if you want to live at home then you have to follow the rules at
home.’” On the other side, a public defender described reconciling his clients to court
mandated consequences by showing the choice that the young person has between doing
what the court recommends or facing worse consequences, “You have to approach the
kid and say ‘you may not think this is the best way, but it’s certainly better than being
locked up in here. I know you don’t want to go to this anger management group, I know
you don’t want to go to this after school thing for getting your credits, but in the long run
it’s probably a lot better.” Alternatives make the court’s chosen consequences seem more
reasonable. When the young person is made to see that the other options are worse than
the one that the court recommends, then the consequence appears fairer. While these
arguments justify a consequence-based model, they are also arguments about the child’s
best interest. Court actors simultaneously show why the consequence is necessary as
punishment and also why it is best for the child. Court actors incorporate the juvenile
court’s treatment element into disposition’s punishment in order to balance both aspects
of juvenile justice. The court simultaneously punishes and helps the child, because every
consequence is simultaneously treatment and punishment.
The complex nature of juvenile consequences, which incorporate punishment and
rehabilitation make it difficult to assess whether the young person actually experiences
justice in the juvenile court. Court actors disagree about the effectiveness of their
attempts to justify the juvenile justice system to young people. While one judge
expressed hope and confidence that, “After I do a disposition, if the kid is honest, the kid
isn’t going to walk out of here thinking that it was unfair. They may not like it, but they’ll
understand where I’m coming from. They might think it was kind of harsh, but mostly I
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think they’ll say, well, that was fair.” Immediately after the court’s decision, many court
actors argued that young people do not see their consequences as fair. A mental health
worker spoke to a common frustration in the court that young people do not view
consequences in the same way as an adult. He said, “If you’re going to explain to a kid
that it’s really good for them to be send away from home for three months to work on
their personality development, that’s a significant chunk of time for them. Kids are going
to want to go home. They don’t want to sit there and deal with character issues. Adults
may have a better grasp of that than kids.” A prosecutor agreed, noting, “It’s punishment
when they have to do something they wouldn’t have done otherwise.” Court actors
expressed more hope that retrospectively, young people, especially those whom the court
helped reform, would see the justice in the system. One mental health worker thought that
after some time had passed, “kids would say it’s pretty fair.” Justice, however, might not
be something that all young people receive at the hands of the juvenile court. The same
mental health worker added a troubling caveat to his generally hopeful attitude toward
the juvenile court’s fairness, saying, “African-American adults have said that the system
was harsher for them than for white kids. When that many people have the same
perception, I begin to think they are right.” How court actors design justice for young
people, thus, may not always be effective, even in the eyes of the designers of this
justice.80 Hope that the juvenile finds fairness, however, pervades the attitudes of court
actors, particularly the judges, who ultimate bears responsibility for the outcome of a
case.
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More information on recent trends in race and law include e.g. Hart (2005), Wriggins (2005), Herbert
(2006), Massey (2006), Bell (2004).
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The court’s two competing models of justice determine how the court actor
frames fairness for the juvenile. Consequences simultaneously represent punishment and
treatment. As a prosecutor noted, “If you promise something or you threaten something,
you follow through on that. You have to have both carrot and stick because if voluntary
services worked for the population that we see, we wouldn’t see them.” Court actors use
particular arguments and language with young people in order to demonstrate both ideas’
fairness. While emphasizing consequences, court actors also argued that certain outcomes
were in the child’s best interest, or at least that they were better than the alternative.
Along with explaining the rules, justifying the system also gives court actors latitude to
describe justice in whatever terms they imagine will best connect with the child’s
understanding. Juvenile justice transforms into a new system, constrained by law also
open to individual interpretation.

Identification
Many court actors affirm that they choose to work in the juvenile court and see in
themselves a unique aptitude to work with children. Simultaneously, however,
interviewed court actors noted deficiencies in other court members, describing what they
perceived as an inability to identify with juveniles in the court. Identification is framed as
a competition for the child’s trust and respect, with court members’ personal
characteristics (age, race, temperament) as either assets or impediments. The individual
defines the personal identity that she chooses to incorporate into her professional role in
part in terms of perceived need within the court. If an African-American juvenile needed,
for example, a strong African-American role model to keep him on the right path, then a
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court actor might define his role as filling this need, as well as using his ability to fill this
role as evidence of his superior ability to identify.
The distinction dominating the Ingalls County court actors’ worldview is that
some individuals work well with kids and others just don’t “get” kids. An individual who
self-identified as being “good with kids” argued that:
There are people who gravitate to work with juveniles and they’re different
than the ones who work with adults. Sometimes you get competency
evaluations because you get lawyers coming down from the adult system who
can’t relate to juveniles. They can’t form a relationship with them and develop
the appropriate rapport so they say they kid can’t assist with their own defense
because they can’t develop a relationship with me, but that’s a two-way
street…You get some who really don’t know how to sit down and talk to kids,
don’t know that they function differently.
A public defender said, “I don’t think prosecutors have enough training or understanding
of corrections and what works with children.” Another public defender simply stated, “I
just feel like I relate well to kids.” A mental health worker commented, “I establish a
rapport, which is remarkably easy if you show them a little respect. I think I am just
gifted at giving them respect because of my experience.” Juvenile court actors form a
group identity by asserting that most people who choose to be in juvenile court are there
because of their personal connections to young people. This group, however, includes
some individuals who were assigned to work in juvenile court and who fail, in the eyes of
their colleagues, to develop a rapport with juveniles. The court group competes and
collaborates in order to bring the juvenile into the system.
Race appeared as the shared identity most commonly when African-American
court actors emphasized adult-juvenile interactions. These interactions defined by racial
identification appear particularly significant in light of evidence that racial disparity
continues in many juvenile court interactions. Justice, a concept that some court actors
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suggested African-American young people struggle to access, can assume a different
meaning when the arbiter of justice is also African-American. One judge employed
strategies to justify consequences that spoke to a shared racial background, saying,
“Sometimes with black juveniles I will say ‘you have a responsibility to all of us black
folks. When you are out there doing that knuckleheaded stuff you reflect negatively on all
of us.’ Somebody needs to be telling these folks that stuff. I get down with folks like that.
Most of the judges around here can’t, but I can and I do.” The emphasis on race included
ways in which racial minorities could help young people access justice, but also showed
how racial differences between court actors and juveniles could result in a failure to act
justly. As one public defender added, “It’s hard for judges to look at someone who
doesn’t look like them and see them…I think judges are more willing to hold kids of
color because their families don’t look like them. They don’t remind them of their sons
and daughters and nephews, nieces. They look different.” By highlighting a connection
that many court actors cannot access, such as the identification of African-American
court actors to young African-American defendants, these court actors assert their
superior capacity to help the juvenile through the system fairly and in a way that the
young person understands.
Gender and age also function as points of identification between adults and
juveniles, although these characteristics sometimes emphasize a court actor’s point of
view than to a particular shared experience. While with race, the court actor speaks
directly to a shared point of reference with the juvenile, other forms of identity generally
gave court actors a different perspective on the juvenile’s experience even if they had
little in common with the young person. While none of the court actors are children, a
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public defender who noticed, “Some of the judges are kind of old and they’ve forgotten
what it’s like to be a kid,” implying that other court actors are younger and remember
adolescence more clearly. A prosecutor added, “I think that I can be really understanding
to a teenage boy who sometimes does stupid things that maybe some of the females don’t
understand. I remember being a teenage boy. I remember doing incredibly stupid things
for no purpose, so I’d like to think that I bring that to the table.” These comments
emphasize the court actor’s empathy for the juvenile. While not citing gender
specifically, one judge pointed to her experiences as a mother and grandmother, saying,
“I have a lot of children. I think that that helps in my decision-making process. I think the
judge who has not had children in their life or been a primary caretaker or had difficulties
have a harder time deciding.” This statement’s connection to gender follows from the
feminine attributes of the primary caretaker role. In each case, the court actor argues that
some other member of the court lacks certain qualities which make him or her able to
relate to the juvenile and, thus, asserting a superior claim to the child’s trust.
How these points of identification influence the court actor’s behavior in a
particular case is not always clear. While beyond the scope of this study, one hypothesis
is that ability or failure to connect to a young person changes the severity of punishment
that the court actor supports. Another possible correlation between identification and the
juvenile’s experience is that young people may accept the law’s authority more readily if
they feel a connection between themselves and those who enforce law. Finally, young
people might be less likely to re-offend if they feel a personal connection to an adult who
would be disappointed if the young person continued to act out. Discretion within the
juvenile court, particularly in language, allows the court actors to behave in range of
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ways toward the juvenile. The young person must choose whom to trust and if they are to
trust the system at all. In order to make a meaningful connection with the juvenile, court
actors assert elements of their personal character with which the juvenile can identify.
This process reinforces the uniqueness of juvenile justice by drawing a line between
individuals who can work with kids and those who cannot, but it also fosters competition
between court actors. Many statements made by court actors regarding identification
frame the court actor’s ability to connect with the juvenile in terms of another court
actor’s failure to connect.

Conclusion
A young person could pass through juvenile delinquency court understanding the
process enough to know when to plead guilty and when to contact probation, but never
accessing the court’s meaning, value, or purpose. Court actors attempt to move beyond
law and procedure to make the court’s meaning understandable to an audience that has
very different life experiences and cognitive abilities than the average defendant
population. Reflecting on the frustration of working with young people, one mental
health worker said, “My job is to give wisdom to young folks at a time when they don’t
want it.” The court’s institutional constraints such as rules of procedure and dense legal
language, often meaningless to young people, become opportunities for creativity and
discretion when court actors attempt to include the juvenile defendant in the court
process. Juvenile court actors use images and language that have resonance with young
people, frame consequences in ways that they hope young people will accept, and
compete for the juvenile’s trust and attention through their personal identities. The
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competition for trust demonstrates how the court has become an adversarial system,
while maintaining some of the core principles of the rehabilitative model. Court actors
frame some of their interactions as adversarial, but not in the strictly legal sense. Their
weapons are not legal arguments, but rather they wield personal characteristics in the
battle for a young person’s trust.
The court group collaborates to create a juvenile-specific approach, but they also
compete between individuals and roles. Public defenders and prosecutors, for example,
have different attitudes toward making the young person nervous. While a prosecutor
might argue that scaring the child keeps him out of trouble, the public defender claims
such actions are manipulative. Individuals compete for the juvenile’s attention and trust
as well. They highlight certain identities with which the juvenile can identify, often
contrasting personal ability to connect with a young person to another court member’s
failure to do so. Court actors, thus, change alliances and points of view toward other court
members based upon what they perceive as the juvenile’s need to understand the system
and feel included in the process.
Individuals within the juvenile system must create “justice” for children – as seen
by the children – which means finding ways to articulate a contradictory message of
punishment and rehabilitation. While modifying the system to fit the child supports a
traditional juvenile court philosophy, many court actors do so in order to justify
consequentialist responses to juvenile crime. Explaining the rules both incorporates the
young person into an adult world and modifies that world for the young person. Court
actors function as mediators between the juvenile and the law, and the strategies that they
employ change to fit a particular case’s needs. Juvenile court actors have unique
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opportunities because the population that they serve is fundamentally incompatible with
some of the premises of criminal law. Young people experience law differently than do
adults, but in many ways the law treats them the same. Although many important
differences exist within the law between adult and juvenile court, the basic structure and
language remains similar enough that young people struggle to access meaning in a
system created by adults. The power relationship between children and adults is also
sufficiently unique that certain dynamics exist between individuals in the juvenile court
that are not formally articulated in the law. Court actors struggle to overcome the
discrepancies between the system and the population to which it applies, but they also use
this unique relationship to their advantage in certain circumstances, for example where
the child needs to be scared so that he won’t come back. Through language and
identification individuals can adapt within the strict legal world and frame their roles
based upon perceived necessity.
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Chapter Six:
Conclusion
Punishment, and rehabilitation have their place in every case that comes through
the juvenile court. Many court actors express certainty that the basic principle of
rehabilitation remains the guiding force in Ingalls County. This clarity of purpose
surfaced in statements like, “We’re not the bad guys. We’re not there to just lock kids up,
but to hopefully open doors to some services,” and, “What we do really is primarily
designed to rehabilitate.” Even members of the juvenile court outside of the county
attorney’s office agreed with this sentiment, like one public defender who said, “There is
some kind of a social work aspect of juvenile court where they are actually trying to find
the best resolution to help the kid.” A judge concluded that at disposition, “The whole
room, even the prosecutor will be looking at what each child needs.” These same court
actors, however, also noted elements in the court that go beyond rehabilitation, because,
as one prosecutor said, “some of the kids in the juvenile justice system need significant
consequences.” A public defender noted that these “significant consequences”
sometimes, “outweigh any benefit these kids are getting.” A judge justified choices to
certify juvenile to adult court by saying, “I think we do have to take violent crime
seriously.” The tension noted by legal scholars at the broadest institutional level in
juvenile courts also exists at the personal level in Ingalls County. Juvenile court actors in
Ingalls County, however, do not have the luxury of critiquing the system without
providing daily solutions. Court actors work directly with young people in a complex and
often contradictory system. Within these parameters, court actors employ strategies that
they hope will be effective in each case.
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The Argument
This thesis begins by articulating a challenge faced by the 21st century American
juvenile court; its rationale in unclear. I explore this problem by identifying three
elements of juvenile justice that are necessary, but often contradictory – rehabilitation,
due process, and punishment. I argue that these elements are both contradictory and
necessary because juvenile as subjects of the law pose difficult questions since they are
both protected wards and perpetrators of crime. From this contradictory model of justice,
I argue that the point where the elements of each model are balanced is with the
individual. Individuals within the court, thus, modify behaviors and attitudes to act as
mediators between traditionally juvenile and traditionally criminal ideals and processes.
In Chapter Two, the thesis follows the development of these three juvenile justice
philosophies through their historical periods. Each period provides a new perspective on
juvenile crime, which address some of the deficiencies of earlier models, but also pose
new problems for the juvenile court. The chapter then addresses how scholars in political
science, law, and sociology have examined courts in the past. While legal scholars give
insight into institutional rationale, they tend to miss the important scene of action in the
juvenile court’s philosophical development, which in fact lies in the individual, daily
interactions of the court. Sociolegal approaches to studying courts provide tools for
examining these individual, daily interactions. These scholars, however, have not
produced a through examination of delinquency court using this approach.
In Chapter Three, the thesis moves from the broad historical narrative and
framework for studying the court to the specific context in which this study was
conducted. The history and legal framework of Minnesota provide the backdrop for my
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research. Understanding the constraints placed upon court actors by their legal choices
serves to contrast the approaches employed by court actors in the following chapters.
Chapter Four demonstrates how court actors balance elements of juvenile justice
by approaching the young person with certain attitudes about identity and blame. These
attitudes, as apply standards of personal responsibility to young people. While the court
actors work within the framework that punishes only the direct perpetrator of an offense,
court actors widen their definitions of blame and responsibility to include society and
family. Personal punishment, however, also remains an important factor in the court, as
court actors emphasize the juvenile’s responsibility for his actions. Court actors construct
a young person who is both a responsible criminal and a non-responsible child, often
within the same juvenile. Without denying that young people can be dangerous, court
actors attempt to explain this danger through the young person’s identity, pointing to
external forces that act upon the young person and make him act out. They balance these
two visions by adopting the role of guide through the justice process so that the juvenile
might be both responsible and treatable.
Building from this vision of the young person, Chapter Five explores how guiding
the juvenile through the justice system requires that the court actor practice certain
strategies to explain and justify the system. Court actors move from seeing the juvenile as
both child and criminal to making a justice system that works for both a child and a
criminal. This process requires justifying consequences in a way that young people
understand. First, the court actor explains the rules of the game, thereby valuing due
process as more than an ideal that has little meaning in a system where defendants cannot
access the court’s language and rationale. Then, court actors incorporate the punishment
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element of juvenile justice into the young person’s experience by justify in juvenilespecific terms the consequences of illegal behavior. While incorporating due process and
punishment, however, the court actor remains faithful to the original juvenile court
philosophy by modifying her behavior to fit a juvenile-specific model that provides hope
for redemption within the court’s consequences. This process is not always cooperative
between all members of the court. Sometimes, court actors compete for the young
person’s trust. This competition further highlights the importance that court actors place
upon ensuring that the young person understands and appreciates the juvenile justice
system.

Implications
This thesis presents the beginning of a way to approach the juvenile court. The
relationship between court actors and competing models of justice requires further
attention and study. While the idea that court actors serve as mediators between these
models of juvenile and criminal justice provides a promising starting point, that idea can
be taken much further with greater resources and attention from the academic
community. Legal scholars continue to study the institutional development of the court’s
rationale, which does little to illuminate the ways in which two contradictory, but
necessary models of justice are balanced in the juvenile court. Additionally, scholars who
possess the methodological tools to examine individual legal interactions have not yet
turned their attention to the juvenile court. This study generates suggestions at both the
theoretical and empirical levels, and this is a vital time to initiate research. The juvenile
court is evolving and attention to the institution during the coming years could show
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significant changes in the attitudes and approaches of its agents. While the core values of
the court are unlikely to shift dramatically, the equilibrium between protection,
punishment, and due process could change based upon societal perceptions, new thinking
in child development, or new top-down legal environments beginning with the Supreme
Court. Future scholars would do well to follow these shifts closely both at the national
and the local level, as the way the law treats children has deep repercussions for the
development of future citizens.
The single case study method employed in this study needs to be expanded across
jurisdictions in a variety of states and in diverse communities. We can likely anticipate
that this approach will reveal more breadth to the responses given by court actors, as well
as deepening our confidence in the findings reported here. A multi-state study would be
particularly revealing in the area of juvenile courts because the statutory framework,
particular history, and cultural beliefs regarding juveniles can vary significantly from
state to state. While qualitative research that relies on interviews and observation remain
the best method for obtaining a rich picture of beliefs and behavior, that picture could
only become richer and fuller with the addition of a survey of a random sample of court
actors from around the state or country, showing the frequency of certain kinds of
responses. Such tools aimed at the aggregate view could be instrumental in disentangling
the influence of traits like gender, race, or professional role in court actors’ attitudes.
On a theoretical level, this study shifts to site of conflict about the juvenile court’s
“rationale” from the institution to the individual. One important implication of my
argument is that juvenile court actors hold more power than might be initially apparent.
In the contradictions and unresolved tendencies of juvenile justice, it isn’t procedural
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discretion but a competition of social visions, constructing pathways to juvenile justice
that must be found in practice because they do not exist within the formal text of the law.
Thus, despite the pages of law review articles calling for institutional change in the
juvenile court, individual actors remain the best agents for reconciliation between due
process, punishment, and rehabilitation. Recognition on the part of all actors in the
juvenile court’s development, from legislators to law clerks, that how young people are
seen and treated in the court helps define the effective meaning of the court’s core
philosophy.
Where does the juvenile court go from here? This study suggests several paths for
further research. Focusing on outcomes, the juvenile court’s success can be measured on
two levels: first, do court actors employ strategies that balance models of justice in the
way that they intend, and second, do juveniles return to law-abiding behavior? The
purpose of my analysis has been to demonstrate why these questions require answers.
The next step in this research should be to test the outcomes of various strategies
employed by court actors. One exciting new area of research, whose implications fit well
with the study presented here, is that of the Juvenile Detention Alternative Initiative,
whose focus is on providing support for young people who cannot remain in the
community that does not include detention. Many court actors in vanguard counties
across the country approach this initiative in order to address questions of disparate racial
impact, child development, and how best to rehabilitate dangerous juvenile offenders.
This example, as well as many others, could demonstrate how court actors act under
certain assumptions about the efficacy of their approaches and the less-explicit qualities
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they contribute to the process. Whether or not they are correct in their assumptions – and
faith – remains to be tested.
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Appendix A

CONSENT FORM
I am conducting a study of legal professionals who work with juvenile cases. I want to
understand how juvenile responsibility is defined and constructed. You were selected as a
possible participant because you currently work with juvenile cases. Please read this form
and ask any questions you may have before agreeing to be in the study.
This study is being conducted by: Clare Ryan, Senior, Political Science Department,
Macalester College 1600 Grand Avenue Saint Paul, MN 55105, cryan@macalester.edu.
My faculty advisor for this project is Prof. Patrick Schmidt, Political Science Department,
schmidtp@macalester.edu.

Procedures:
If you agree to be in this study, I would ask you to do the following things:
Participate in one individual interview of approximately one hour. This interview will be
conducted and tape-recorded by myself. I will also ask if you are willing to suggest
names of other people in your field who might be interested in participating in this study.

Voluntary Nature of the Study:
Participation in this study is voluntary. Your decision whether or not to participate will
not affect your current or future relations with Macalester College. If you decide to
participate, you are free to not answer any question or withdraw at any time without
affecting those relationships.

Risks and Benefits of being in the Study
The study has several risks. One risk may be that during the interview your privileged
relationship with juveniles may be compromised. However, I will not enquire about any
specific cases or ask for details about any client. Second, I will ask you to discuss
decision-making procedures, approaches and work practices. This information could be
used by third parties, including opponents of the status quo.
The benefits include that you will be helping to create a systematic understanding of your
county’s legal professionals’ attitudes and behaviors regarding juvenile responsibility.

Confidentiality:
The records of this study will be kept private. I will not include any information that will
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make it possible to identify a subject in any paper or presentation I make based on this
research. Research records will be stored securely and only researchers will have access
to the records.
I will keep one copy of the tape-recorded interview, unless asked otherwise by the
interviewee, until I have made one transcription of the tape. Only myself and Professor
Schmidt will have access to the transcripts. All use of quotations in written work will be
limited and edited so as to prevent identification of individual identities. All recorded
materials will be kept in a secure location and erased immediately after use.
Transcriptions will not include names or affiliated employers, but will include the
subject’s job description.
In the event that you are able to recommend other interview subjects, I will ask to use
your name as a reference. If you agree, those people whom you recommend to participate
will know that you are affiliated with this study.

Contacts and Questions:
You may ask any questions you have now. If you have questions later, you are
encouraged to contact me or my faculty advisor. If you have any questions or concerns
regarding this study and would like to talk to someone other than the researcher(s), you
are encouraged to contact the Macalester College Institutional Review Board at 1600
Grand Avenue, Saint Paul MN 55105 or by phone at 651-696-6153.
You will be given a copy of this information to keep for your records.

Statement of Consent:
I have read the above information. I have asked questions and have received answers. I
consent to participate in the study.

Signature:_____________________________________________ Date:
__________________
Signature of Investigator:_________________________________ Date:
__________________
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Appendix B
Dear _________:
My name is Clare Ryan and I am a senior at Macalester College. To complete my
Political Science degree with Honors, I am beginning a yearlong project with the aim of
creating a publishable piece of scholarship. The title of this project is “Old Enough:
Constructing Juvenile Responsibility in County Courts.” I would like to understand how
the legal community of this county defines juvenile responsibility in practice. In order to
best realize this goal, I hope to interview members of this community who have a
particular specialty in juvenile law, or who prosecute, defend, or judge juvenile cases.
I am asking for your help with my research. If you are willing, I would like to conduct an
interview with you and others in your field. The interview would be one-on-one and
would last no more than one hour. I am interested in the questions that you face about
juvenile maturity and decision-making capacities while handling cases involving minors.
The identities of each participant will be kept entirely confidential. I will ask to record the
interview, however, there will be no written record connecting your name to any
comments that you make during the interview. Additionally, I will not ask any questions
about specific cases and am not interested in details about any individual juveniles.
Attached you will find a copy of the Macalester College approved consent form with
more details about the project and my resume to provide context for my interest in this
field.
I eagerly await your response and I hope to speak with you further at your convenience.
Sincerely,
Clare Ryan
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